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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: INDIA, THE WORLD'S LARGEST DEMOCRACY?
Introduction
The debate on the most appropriate form of government appears to
have been answered with the fall of the communist Soviet Union and its
allies. These previously undemocratic countries have all made moves
toward democratization. However, this conclusion as to the overwhelming
success of the Western style democracy as the prototype political institution
to be espoused is certainly not unanimous. This debate is best summarized
by the work of Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History", and the opposing
argument presented by Ken Jowitt in his "The New World Disorder".
Fukuyama asserts that it is democracy's inherent strengths, and due to
the shortcomings of antidemocratic regimes that the democratic type of
government has won the competition as to what is the most appropriate
form of government. Fukuyama asserts that we may be witnessing "the end
point of man's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western
liberal democracy as the final form of human government ." 1 Not only does
Fukuyama assert that liberal capitalism is the prevailing paradigm, but he
additionally states that it is as a matter of fact, the absolute end of history.
However, with the massive moves towards democratization world wide,
Fukuyama also envisages a rising level of ethnic conflict, a well as the
continuation of terrorism. Clearly, such a definitive statement based on the
failure of anti-democratic regimes seems to be too idealistic.
In contrast to Fukuyama, Ken Jowitt's hypothesis is that though
democracy has appeared to have won, the liberal democratic ideology is the
Fukuyama, Francis, "The End of History ", The National Interest 16 ,Summer 1989:3-18.
1
kind of ideology which will always leave some portion of dissatisfied human
beings, and will therefore generate powerful anti-liberal movements from
that section of the population. Therefore in contrast to Fukuyama who
argues that there will be no other major government dominated by an anti-
democratic ideology, due to the apparent success of democracy, Jowitt posits
that there could be a new way of life where the ideology would be
comparable to that of the democratic ideology. Jowitt suggests that, the world
will regularly witness the rise of both internal and external movements
dedicated to destroying or reforming it-movements that in one form or
another will stress ideals of group membership, expressive behavior,
collective solidarity, and heroic action ."2 These other ideologies could
include the pan-Islamic types of government etc.
Although Jowitt does not conclusively state which type of counter
ideology will prevail, he does allow for those of us who believe that the
Western style democratic institutions is not the only way to modernize.
There does seem to be a world wide trend toward democratization, but there
are some countries where existing democracies have been toppled, to be
replaced with not any other particular type of government, but with chaos
and anomie. Such a case is India.
India is a parliamentary secular democracy, modeled after the British
Westminster type of government. However, the tenability of India as a
secular democracy is dubious with the secessionist movements in various
parts of the country. The states of Punjab and Kashmir, along with others
like Assam, Nagaland etc., are all in the throes of a deep crisis. This thesis is
a study of the conflict in the two states of Punjab and Kashmir, and the
failure of democracy in both states.
2Jowitt, Ken, "The New World Disorder", Journal of Democracy ,Winter 1991:11-20.
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However, prior to identifying the actual crisis in India, it is first
important to define what constitutes a democracy, and what leads to a crisis
of governability such as the one India finds itself in.
What is a Democracy?
According to Schmitter and Karl, a "Modern political democracy is a
system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions
in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and
cooperation of their elected representatives ."3 The existence of a democracy
also includes:
2.
control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested
in elected officials.
2. elected officals are chosen in frequent and fairly conduced elections win
which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
3. practically all adults have the right to vote...
4. practically all adults have the right to fun for elective office.
5. citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe
punishment...
6. citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information.
7 citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations
or organizations... 4
There are some prerequisites as to what constitutes a democracy. The
literature overwhelmingly suggests that a wealthy nation has a greater
chance to sustain a democracy. If the citizens live in poverty, it is not
possible for the mass of the population to develop the self restraint necessary
to avoid becoming demagogic.5 Therefore, a society divided between a large
^Schmitter
,
Phillipe C & Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is. ..and Is Not" in Larry
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds.. The Global Resurgencv of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1993:40.
^Schmitter and Karl,1993, citing, Dahl, Robert, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democarcy, New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982:11.
5Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy" in The American Political Science Review, 1967:73; Huntington, Samuel P.,
"Democracy's Third Wave" 1989:22; Sanguinetti, Julio Maria 1990:57,;Ake, Claude,
"Rethinking Africa's Democracy", 1993:73) all in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds..
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poor section, and a smaller rich elite will result in either an oligarchy or a
tyranny
.
6 Lipset has been challenged by several scholars, particularly those
writing on the English speaking Caribbean, which deviate from this model
since these countries tend to be very poor, yet with strong democratic
institutions.
Other important prerequisites for a democracy include the degree of
urbanization and literacy. The greater the level of education the lower strata
are more exposed to cross pressures which will reduce the intensity of their
commitment to given ideologies and make them less receptive to supporting
extremist ones." This occurs by an increase in their involvement in an
integrated national culture, as opposed to an isolated and distinct one, and
therefore, the lower strata and the middle class form a coalition with middle
class values which tend to be more moderate. Therefore, a large middle class
is important because it is the one which plays a mitigating role in
moderating conflict by rewarding moderate and democratic parties, and
punishes more extremist ones . 7
Also rather controversially, Lipset suggests that national income of a
country is related to the political values of the upper classes since the lower
the standard of living of the lower classes, for psychological reasons it
becomes necessary for the upper classes to treat the lower strata as "vulgar,
innately inferior, as a lower caste ."8 Subsequently, the poorer country, the
greater the tendency to engage in nepotism, since if there is sufficient wealth
in the country redistribution can take place in an egalitarian fashion.
However, when there is not much wealth, there is fierce competition for the
The Global Resurgencv of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,
1993.
^Lipset, 1967:75.
7Lipset, 1967:83.
®Lipset, 1967:83.
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scarce resources
.
9 Though his second point appears to be justifiable given the
documented high levels of corruption, and extensive patronage networks
existing in many developing societies, his argument attesting to the
psychological need of the upper classes to treat the lower strata in a
contemptible fashion is based on highly tenous grounds.
Additionally, political systems which do not allow the lower strata
access to power except through revolutionary means inhibit the growth of
legitimacy since groups which have pushed through forceful means tend to
have hopes which often overestimate what the inherent limitations of
political stability do permit. Therefore, democratic regimes under such stress
will face the difficulty of being regarded as illegitimate. A major test of
democracy is the extent to which nationals have a common "secular political
culture" which maintains the various democratic practices . 10 Additionally,
Huntington suggests that one of the primary criterion for democracy is
equitable and open competition between political parties without
government harassment, or no restriction of opposition groups . 11
Additionally, for Tocqueville, the existence of voluntary associations are an
important feature of democracies.
Therefore, the liberal tradition identifies several values as crucial for a
democracy which includes belief in the legitimacy of a democracy
(particularly amongst the elite), a tolerance for opposition, including their
beliefs and preferences, a willingness to compromise, flexibility and
cooperation, and moderation and civility of political discourse . 12
°Lipset, 1967:85.
^Lipset, 1967:88.
^Huntington, 1993:17.
12Diamond & Plattner, 1993:16.
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In addition to defining what a democracy is, Schmitter and Karl have
added what a democracy is not. According to them, democracies are not
necessarily more efficient, either administratively or economically, they are
not likely to appear more orderly, consensual, stable, or more governable,
and they will not necessarily have more open economies. They suggest that
democracy will not necessarily will bring "economic growth, social peace,
administrative efficiency, political harmony, free markets .." 13 According to
them, none of the above are prerequisites for democracies.
In conclusion, there are at least four different theses for the existence
of democracy. According to the colonial continuity thesis, democratic
practices will flourish if institutions for self rule were placed during colonial
times, and if the transition from colony to independent statehood did not
occur with destruction of those institutions. The second thesis is the political
culture thesis which suggests that democracy requires a commitment at the
very least by the politically active elites to share in the liberal values and
beliefs and in the existence of democracy, which include equality of all
people, values toleration of opposition, free expression, moderation and
compromise. The third thesis, the economic class structure thesis can be
further divided into those that argue that economic development leads to
more complex, educated and secularized societies, which opens the way for
existence and creation of new groups which find expression in democratic
channels. In contrast, Marxist scholars have suggested that the most
important factor is not economic development, but rise of urban and rural
middle classes, which could challenge monopoly of elites . 14 Additionally,
13Schmitter & Karl, 1993:49-52.
14Valuenzuela, Arturo, "Chile: Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a Democratic
Regime", in Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz, & Seymour Martin Lipset, eds.. Politics in Developing
Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1990:52-58.
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there has to be some system of compromise and checks and balances. From
the above, it seems to be that "democracy is most likely in wealthy capitalist
countries with traditions of protodemocracy .
"
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Having defined what constitutes a democracy, it becomes important to
identify what leads to a crisis in governability in democracies.
Crisis of Governabilitv
Huntington suggests that there have been three different waves of
democratization, each of which have been followed by a reverse wave. Each
of these reverse waves succeeded in reducing the number of democratic
countries . 16 If we were to use Huntington's hypothesis, then clearly, India
began its wave of democratization with independence, and to answer his
question as to which stage we are currently at in the third wave, I posit that
India is in the penultimate stages of democracy.
Huntington suggests that among the factors contributing to the move
away from democracy in the first and second waves include,
"(i) the weakness of democratic values among key elite groups. ..(ii) severe
economic setbacks which intensified conflict and enhanced the popularity of
remedies that could only be imposed by authoritarian governments, (Hi)
social and political polarization. ..(iv) determination of conservative middle
class and upper class groups to exclude populist and leftist movements from
power, (iv) breakdown of law and order resulting from terrorism or
insurgency ...'' 17
Another factor which contributes to decay of democracy is
nationalism. One serious threat to democracy is religious intolerance, and
^Kohli, Atul,ed., India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988:6.
16Huntington,1993:3.
^Huntington, 1993:9.
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theocratic aspirations, resulting in terrorism and violence. 18 Additionally,
as long as religious ties reinforce secular politics, chances for compromise
and therefore democracy remain weak. Religious politics do not include
tolerance, and therefore the democracy will be weak and unstable. A stable
democracy also requires relatively moderate tension among the various
contending political forces. Political moderation includes the ability to deal
with resolving key issues before new ones arise. 19
Another threat to social integration can be seen when there is a
cultural and institutional gap between the ruling center and the periphery
found in most developing societies, (Shils, 1975, Weiner 1975) which poses a
threat to social integration especially when there are rising expectations.
Kahane suggests that most elites are then faced with the dilemma that if they
enlarge economic and political participation to increase their support, their
privileges as the ruling elite will be reduced. However, if they do not include
such participation, and exploit their position to retain power, ironically, their
legitimacy will be reduced. However, most elites choose the latter
alternative though this causes frustration to accumulate in the periphery,
and leading to an erosion of legitimacy and subsequently an increase in the
possibility of disintegration.20
Claude Ake also suggests that with reference to Africa, one argument
against democracy in Africa is that since Africa is socially pluralistic, ethnic
differences will be an obstacle to democratic governance. He suggests that
^Kolakowski, Leszek, "Uncertainties of a Democratic Age", in Larry Diamond and Marc F.
Plattner, eds.. The Global Resurgencv of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, 1993:323; Plattner, Marc F., "The Democratic Moment", in Larry Diamond
and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgencv of Democracy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, 1993:35.
19Lipset, 1967:90-97.
20Kahane, Reuven, Legitimation and Integration in Developing Societies: The Case of India ,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1982:2.
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ethnic conflict must be firmly governed, since the liberties of democracy
would inflate ethnic rivalries and therefore pose the danger of political
disintegration. 21 In addition, the threat of political disintegration leads
governments to take away certain democratic principles, which further act as
an obstacle to the existence of a democracy, as the Indian case shows.
However, according to Ake, the problem lies not in the ethnic pluralistic
society, but more in bad leadership. It is the leaders who politicize ethnicity
in a quest for power and political support.22
Importantly, democracy depends on popular legitimacy. Both
Dalpino, who uses Thailand, and Diamond who uses Nigeria, state that
political corruption was a potent factor in overturning the existence of a
democracy. The political corruption in Thailand was a major source of
public discontentment and led to the February 1991 military coup.23
Similarly, democracy has been twice overturned in Nigeria because of the
deep cynicism, economic mismanagement and political turmoil due to
political corruption at the highest levels.24 Both Dalpino and Diamond
suggest that accountability is a key condition for democratic progress.
A key debate in the crisis of governability literature is between
structural functionalists and Marxists. On the side of the structural
functionalists
,
from Durkheim, Parsons,to Huntington, there has been an
almost unanimous consensus on the fact that the transition from "tradition"
to "modernity" is characterized by disorganization and political decay because
21Ake, 1993:72.
22Ake, 1993:72.
23Dalpino, Catharin E., "Thailand's Search for Accountability" in Larry Diamond and Marc
F. Plattner, eds.. The Global Resurgencv of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, 1993:206-216.
24Diamond, Larry, "Nigeria's Perennial Struggle", in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner,
eds.. The Global Resurgencv of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, 1993: 217-228.
9
of the corrosive impact of economic development on existing social ideas
etc .25 Modernity tends to eventually bring democratic stability, but in the
process, it may be destabilizing, as social and economic change, including
urbanization, increases in literacy and education, industrialization, mass
media expansion-extend political consciousness, multiply political demands,
broaden political participation ."26 With the formation of new social groups,
there is an increase in demands as a result of rising expectations", and the
lack of the ability of the institutions to deal with these expectations has
resulted in stagnation of the institutions themselves, and further social
decay.
For Marxists, the driving force is capitalism as a result of
modernization and the class conflict which arises from such capitalistic
modernization. For Marxists, as stated by Gramsci, the crisis of authority in
transitional societies can be explained by "... precisely that great masses have
become detached from their traditional ideology and not longer believe what
they used to believe previously .."27
Marxists suggest that class conflict is important for political decay,
while developmentalists suggests that "value disequilibrium" leads to
political decay. Therefore, what structural functionalist scholars label social
disorganization, Marxists call class conflict. However, while structural
functionalists see this growing modernization resulting in the breakdown of
social and political order, Marxists see in this decline of traditional
domination, a possibility of revolutionary change as a result of new class
25Kohli, 1988:12.
26Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968:5.
27Kohli, Atul, citing Gramsci, in Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of
Governabilitv. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990:25.
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consciousness
.
28 Therefore, while for Marxists this anomie is inherently
good, for structural functionalists, the crisis is inherently detrimental and
institutions must and will adapt to meet these changes
Regardless of the differences between the two, both suggest that the
roots of the crisis of governability lies in the fact that there has been a decline
of tradition, and an increase in socioeconomic demands. However, because
the institutional capacity of governments to deal with these new demands
does not form as quickly as the demands themselves, there is a breakdown in
order, and there is therefore a problem in governability. With specific
reference to India, the argument of the structural functionalists appears to be
more valid. As the following thesis will show, the central government has
not been able to deal with the new demands placed by the various new
groups which have formed, and therefore, this has led to social decay, and
overcentralization.
Other scholars have suggested that the breakdown of democracies can
also be attributed to crises of legitimacy .29 Kohli suggests that there are
different political variables including leadership, ideology, intra-elite
harmony which can influence how well a democratic state can be governed.
Demagogic leaders can exacerbate tensions, widely divergent ideological
beliefs can make rule difficult.
Central to the crisis in India is the issue of the state. One of the main
problems of a stable democracy is to ensure that the state does not become too
swollen and the power of the state must be restrained so that the politicians
in power remain responsive and accountable to the people. The state must
not be too powerful, but if it is too weak it may be unable to deliver the social
28Kohli, 1990:27.
29Kohli, 1990:13, citing Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1978.
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and economic goods that conflicting groups demand. Additionally, the state
bureaucracy must be subject to control by elected politicians but at the same
time, the relative autonomy of the bureaucracy must be a check on party
politicians who are susceptible to patronage and corruption .30
Lastly is the issue of military. Once the military has been deployed it
has a tendency to only grow more, diminishing the "stability and the
authenticity" of democracy. Therefore, military control be oriented only
toward external defense, and not be an answer to internal problems. 3 ^ If the
military is used for reasons to suppress the masses, then democracy can be
considered almost doomed to failure.
Defining the State
Given that this thesis is going to examine state-society relations in
India which has contributed to the decline of democratic principles in India,
it therefore becomes necessary to define the state. There are four different
approaches to explaining the role of the state. The first one, the Marxist and
dependency approach define state as "an alliance for social control which
reflects and reproduces class relationships in the society; it takes the form of
institutions to achieve legitimation and coercion; its purpose is to maintain
the dominance of a given mode of production and the specific class
relationships that this implies ."32 For such theorists, the state holds
considerable power, yet acts as a populist reformer in the agrarian sector. The
second approach comes from a Weberian perspective which defines the state
as an apparatus that makes decisions and authoritatively exercises control
^Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1990: 23.
^Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1990:25, citing Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics:
Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988:123.
32Grindle, Merilee S., State & Countryside. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ Press, 1986:16.
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over a particular area (Skocpol, 1978; Stepan, 1978; Nordlinger, 1981). The
third approach includes a pluralist analysis of different interest groups vying
for power, and the state existing merely as a framework within which these
interests are transmitted. Finally, the state is seen as a medium for
enactment of policies embraced by state elites. In this approach, the state has
"identifiable and concrete concerns about the definition and pursuit of
national development. These concerns are independent of, but not
necessarily opposed to or different from the immediate interests or welfare
or any particular groups, class, class fraction, coalition, or alliance in society.33
The Weberian perspective is embraced by sociologist Edward Shils
who gleaning off the work off Weber and Parsons suggested that the state
was to be the key factor in determining a new social order by creating an
effective bureaucracy which would be in charge of guiding the economy.
Shils outlined key relations between what he termed the Center (the state)
and the periphery. For Shils, there were three primary components of
Center-periphery relations. These included a centralized value system which
attempted to have one unifying ideology, institutions which then
transmitted this ideology to the otherwise heterogeneous periphery, and
lastly the elites who were custodians of the value system and who controlled
the different institutions.34 Therefore, inherently for Shils, the state was
activist and aggressive, while the periphery was a passive one waiting to be
controlled. The obvious shortfall of this center-periphery model is the
critique that such a model was highly ethnocentric (Western bias). This
33Grindle, 1986:17
34Migdal, Joel, "A Model of State-Society Relations" in Wiarda, Howard ed., New Directions
in Comparitive Politics. Westview Press, Boulder, 1991:47-48.
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resulted in the emergence of other contending models describing state-
society relations
.
35
The pluralist approach is most evident in the work of Joel Migdal, a
political scientist who outlines a different approach of state-society relations
where the society was a mixture of various social organizations rather than
merely one structure. For Migdal, the state, is then an independent variable,
which in tandem with other organizations offers individual strategies or
personal survival. Furthermore, individual choices amongst the various
strategies is purely based on the inducements in the form of material
incentives, exhortation and coercion. For Migdal, the state is only part of the
environment of politics, and must fight with others to dominate politics.
Migdal then outlines three indicators which determine the strength of the
state. These include how effectively a state can compel its population to
conform with its policies, whether a state can organize the population for
certain tasks, and lastly the state's legitimacy as in the eyes of the
population . 36
The view of the state as one which is dominant and controlling and
not reflective of popular sentiment, is espoused mostly by those who have
written on the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America. In these
regions, the corporatist way of life is the most preeminent one (Bowen,
Wiarda, Schmitter, Berger etc.). In contrast to such bureaucratic
authoritarian scholars are academics who view the state as a helpless
institution which facing a large number of diverse interests are not able to
effectively maintain control or govern, and are subject to revolution
(Huntington). Other scholars have gone as far as suggesting that the concept
35Migdal, 1991:49
36Migdal, 1991:52-53
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of the state does not exist in developing countries, and as such, parties play a
more important role in determining politics. For Nettl, the concept of the
state emerged as a result of narrowing the society into ethnically
homogenous or defined areas .37 Additionally, with specific reference to
socialist countries, Kesselman suggests that one of the main roles of the
socialist state is to ensure that it ties in the workers class and peasantry with
the socialist movement if the movement is to be successful .38
Lastly, one of the seminal works on the role of the state in post
colonial societies is Hamza Alavi's work on the state in Pakistan and
Bangladesh which is representative of the Marxist school of thought. Alavi's
arguments can be summarized as follows. Alavi suggests that the post-
colonial state had its power base in the metropolis, and therefore did not
represent any indigenous class interests. Therefore, the state could act more
independently. Additionally, the state took a large amount of the surplus
and directed it to certain types of activity. Therefore, for Alavi, the state was
dependent on the bureaucracy to maintain its legitimacy and power. In
contrast, John Saul points out that "the overdeveloped nature of the state is
not due to the need to subordinate such classes, but to the need to
subordinate pre-capitalist formations to the imperatives of colonial
capitalism ."39
37Nettl, J.P., "The State as a Conceptual Variable", in Louis J. Cantori, & Andrew H. Ziegler,
eds., Comparitive Politics in the Post-Behavioural Era. Lynne Reiner Publishers, Colorado,
1988.
1988:326
38 Kesselman, Mark, "The State and Class Struggle: Trends in Marxist Political Science," in
Cantori & Ziegler, eds., Comparitive Politics in the Post-Behavioural Era, Lynne Reiner
Publishers, Colorado, 1988:128
39Leys, Colin, "The Overdeveloped Post-Colonial State: A Reevaluation," RAPE no. 5, April
1976:41
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India: The Crisis
There were four different theories that predicted the demise of
democracy in India. The first one was the theory of political culture which
suggested that India’s hierarchical social structures could not sustain
democracy. According to Almond and Verba, India's political culture was far
from being the "civic culture" necessary for a democracy. The traditions of
hierarchy and caste institutions made India inappropriate for democracy.
The second theory stated that the social cleavages within India between
religions, linguistic groups etc. raised questions about the compatibility of
India and democracy. This thesis was most eloquently conveyed by Selig
Harrison in his, India-The Dangerous Decades, where the hypothesis that
India would definitely fall apart as a result of such divisions first took hold.
As he states, "the odds are amost wholly against the survival of freedom and
that. ..the issue is, in fact, whether any Indian state can survive at all ."40 Also
scholars like John Stuart Mill suggested that social heterogeneity endangered
democracy. This argument therefore suggested that the country might
endure secessionist tendencies by either having a weak, truncated center
with strong provincial rulers, or an authoritarian state which held the state
together. The third theory predicting the demise of India's democracy
suggested that democratic institutions required literacy, and wealth. India
with massive unemployment and poverty was therefore not a good
democratic experiment. One variation of the argument is that a low rate of
economic growth would lead to several dissatisfied members of the
populace, which would then lead to revolutionary appeals. The second
version of this thesis is that a high rate of growth which failed to distribute
^Harrison, Selig S., India the Most Dangerous Decades. Oxford University Press,
Madras:1960:338.
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benefits of growth equitably would generate class conflicts between the haves
and the have-nots. The fourth theory posited by Barrington Moore was that
a radicalized peasantry would turn against the land owning classes if the
peasantry was linked to the bourgeousie or intelligentsia, but would become
merely a conservative and passive force if they were linked to the landed
class. This would determine whether there would be democracy or not.
Clearly ,in the latter case, democracy would not reach the poorer masses.41
In contrast to the above scholars who portend the demise of
democracy in India, an alternative group of scholars suggest that India has in
fact been able to counter centralizing trends by modernizing, and by
developing flexible institutions. (Kothari, 1970; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1967;
Weiner, 1967; Kahane, 1982).42
However, as this thesis will show, though India still exists as a
democracy, it's actions in the two states of Punjab and Kashmir have been far
from democratic. Certainly, the state has not been able to develop flexible
institutions and has repressed the secessionist movements in both states in
the most undemocratic fashion. To counter the claim of the second school
who state that India has been able to counter antidemocratic trends, the
scholars who believe in the merit of the school which portends the demise of
India's democratic demise offer an explanation. They posit that just because
it has not yet happened, does not mean it will never happen. For these
scholars it is just a question of time before democracy falls in India. The
claims of these authors appears to be substantiated by evidence presented in
this thesis.
41 Weiner, Myron, The Indian Paradox : Essays in Indian Politics. New Delhi: Sage
Publications, 1989:322.
42Kahane, 1982:12.
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The Role of the State in India
The role of the state in India, as well as in other countries is key as it
plays an important role in determining the existence of democracy. The state
is not only responsible for social order, but also for economic development.
Therefore, it may at times be in a conflictual situation where it is trying to
promote economic growth which could lead to political disorder.
In a socialist country like India, the state has a highly interventionist
nature which tends to be troublesome, and therefore leads to problems in
legitimacy. Since the state is responsible for economic growth it cannot claim
that distributive problems are social and not political, and are not related to
it. Secondly, since the state controls resources, battles for these resources are
fought not in the economic arena, but also in the political arena, therefore
politicizing society, and economics. Therefore, it is difficult for an
interventionist state like India to be democratic, because it is often in a
controversial relationship with society.43
As this thesis will show, the Indian state has been activist and
interventionist in nature, and it is the actions of the state which have been
anti-democratic, centralizing and based on personalistic fulfillment rather
than attainment of goals for society at large. To demonstrate this fact, two
case studies of the states of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir have been used.
Chapter 2 is a historical analysis of the crisis in the Punjab. Punjab is
in the northwestern part of India, bordering Pakistan. It also shares another
border with the troubled state of Jammu and Kashmir. The only land route
into Jammu and Kashmir from India is through the Punjab. Additionally,
Punjab serves as the bread basket of India. Therefore, for a number of
reasons, both economic and political, Punjab is of crucial importance to the
43Kohli, 1990:30.
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state of India, and its troubled existence within the Indian union,
unsurprisingly, is an important element of Indian politics.
1947, the year of independence itself was marked by conflict in the
region, as Punjab was divided into the Pakistan Punjab, and the Indian
Punjab. Mass migrations ensued, with the Muslims moving over to the
Pakistani Punjab, while the Hindus, and Sikhs remained with, or moved to
the Indian side. This was not to be the end of the existence of conflict in the
region. Though the conflict has historical roots, as the thesis will show the
crisis was exacerbated, and brought to the current stage of secessionist
demand by the actions of the Center and have resulted in a state of anomie
and chaos.
Chapter 3 is a study of the insurgency in the state of Jammu and
Kashmir. The state of Jammu and Kashmir is located in the north west
section of India and shares a border with Pakistan in the west, China in the
east, and the Indian Punjab in the south. The Punjab is the only land route
available to enter the state. Given the geographical location of the state, it is
of no surprise then that it is of crucial security interest to India. For
centuries, the Hindus and Muslims in the state of Jammu and Kashmir have
lived in peaceful harmony, until independence in 1947. 1947 marked a
crucial year in Kashmiri politics for it was when Pakistan and India were
formed based on religion. While India claimed to be a secular state, Pakistan
was an Islamic state. Given that Kashmir had a Muslim majority, the
accession of Kashmir to Pakistan seemed inevitable. However, as this
section shall show, this accession never came about for several reasons, and
Kashmir was retained by India under it's secular, democratic umbrella.
However, as is the case with the Punjab, the centralizing nature of the
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Central government has created a crisis in Kashmir, with a demand for
secession from the Kashmiri Muslims.
The thesis will be structured as follows. Chapters 2 & 3 will deal with
the crises in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, the historical origins and the
actions of the Center which have resulted in the current crisis. Chapter 4
will conclude with a comparison of both conflicts, and reassess the declining
position of India as a democratic state.
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CHAPTER II
THE PUNJAB CRISIS
Introduction
This chapter is a study of the Punjab conflict. I will analyze the extent
to which the Punjab conflict posed serious problems for the effective
functioning of democratic institutions and processes in India. Since
independence the state has been unambiguously committed to preserving
the national unity against all internal and external threats. Specifically the
state has been uncompromising in its stance towards any threat, and any
secessionist movement which develops significant strength has been
crushed, with armed force if necessary. All secessionist demands which
acquired strength were treated in this way, especially in the Punjab and the
Kashmir. In this context, the question that I am raising is whether India has
departed from its proclaimed state of democratic secularism, and has become
a state ruled by an oligarchical elite who are more interested in maintaining
power rather than conforming to established democratic norms. It will be
argued here and in the following chapter that the behaviour and attitude of
the Central government, especially its centralized drive (intensified under
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi), has exacerabated India's political problems,
and is principally responsible for the disintegration of the Indian democratic
secular state.
This chapter traces the evolution of the Sikh conflict. Currently, the
crisis seems to be somewhat under control. However, the demands made by
the Sikhs have not changed. In fact, to the contrary, these demands have
been rising in intensity since the early days of independence. While the
demands made by the minority Sikh population were legitimate in the
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incipient stages, the behaviour and attitude of the central government has
been one of confrontation, and not conciliatory. This has resulted in a
further alienation of the Sikhs, resulting in terrorism, and ultimately in the
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. No doubt, the actions of the
terrorists claiming to be fighting in the name of religion is dastardly.
However, regardless of blame, the issue is a potent one, threatening to tear
apart the Indian union.
Religion & Politics: A Potent Combination in Secular India?
The religion of Sikhism (like Islam) is one where there is no division
between religion and politics. This can be seen in the fundamental
philosophy of the religion itself .44 What was initially a peaceful religion,
started to assume more militant tones under the tenth and last guru. Guru
Govind Singh. There are at least two views which explain the transition of
the religion into a militant one. The first one is the fact that the Sikhs
suffered constant persecution by the ruling Muslim rulers, who recognizing
the growing strength of the religion, regarded Sikhism as evil and declared
that it had to be rooted out of the system. In contrast, however, another
view suggests that the religion embraced militant aspects because of the
internal divisions because of the Jat Sikhs. The Jat Sikhs were followers of
the keshadari sect, who were staunch believers of the Khalsa Panth.
Ideologically, the Khalsa aimed at not only spiritual bliss, but also military
excellence. Therefore, given that the Khalsa demanded military prowess,
and the ability to defend the faith with arms if necessary was deemed
44 The word "Sikh" means "disciple"and the members of the Sikh community are the
disciples of the ten gurus who led the Punjabis from the late fifteenth century to the early
eighteenth century. Sikhism was founded by Guru Nanak (originally a Hindu), who aimed at
creating a faith that would bridge Hinduism and Islam. There were ten gurus, all of whose
teachings are related in the Granth Sahib , the Qu'ran of the Sikhs.
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essential, the religion assumed militant overtones 45 Additionally, for the
Sikhs, there has always been unity between the secular and religious spheres.
This has been persent since Guru Hargobind, the second Guru of the Sikhs,
who formally united religion and politics. It has been argued that this is
incompatible with the Indian political system which is based on the
separation of the two spheres, religion and politics. Given the secular
ideology of the Indian state, this unison of religion and politics espoused by
Sikhism is seen as a threat to the security of the state. This is allegedly one of
the roots of the current conflict.
Important to note is that although Sikhism is a non-violent religion
by ideology, it is also stipulated that if necessary, the religion will be defended
militaristically. But in the name of religion, many dark deeds have been
committed. Although religion is a very personal and intense matter, it also
"provides the means by which the religious person or even the nominal
believer satisfies some unappeasable needs. But, even as a individual
matter, religion for the most part is a shared experience. It is one of those
holdings that links every human being to others ."46
Sikhism has given to the various factions and political parties and the
population, a
"strong cement of traditionally shared beliefs about the meaning of their
existence ."47
From the late 19th century, many Sikh scholars stressed the
distinctiveness of the Sikh community, and argued that it was important to
have a separate identity, with a strong emphasis on traditions. This was in
direct opposition to the rise of the Arya Samaj which was the militant Hindu
ideology which threatened Sikhism. The Arya Samaj was formed by Swami
4
^Kapur, Rajiv, Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986:5.
46Isaacs, Harold, Idols of the Tribe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975:144.
47Isaacs, 1975:152.
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Dayanand in 1875 to promote a more purified and revived form of
Hinduism. The Arya Samaj was very appealing to the Hindus in Punjab,
and this threatened the Sikhs. Therefore, this fear of being assimilated by the
Hindus also forced the creation of the Singh Sabha which emphasised the
need to have a separate identity and focus on traditional values important to
the Sikhs.48
Another early historical indication of the distinctive focus of the Sikhs
on establishing separatist boundaries is evident with the creation of the Tat
Khalsa. In the early 20th century, the gurudwaras (temples) of the Sikhs had
been increasingly under reform because of mismanagement. The demand
for reformation of these gurudwaras, and the mahants who were in charge of
these gurudwaras assumed greater significance as more and more Sikhs
started to suffer from a "mass crisis of identity."49 One group of such
refomers were the Tat Khalsa who vehemently opposed any non-Sikh
element in the religion. What they feared the most again was the
assimilation of Sikhism into Hinduism as by now, many Hindu elements
such as idols, Hiindu customs etc, were all present in Sikh worship. To
reclaim the identity of the Sikh religion, these Tat Khalsa reformers once
again stressed the individuality and separateness of the Sikh religion, and
the need to be distinctive and separate.50
Additionally, for the Sikhs, religion and politics have from the very
start been inseparable elements.51 This is especially problematic for the Sikhs
given they live in the secular state of India, where religion and politics (at
least in theory) have to be separate. However, the Sikh religion affects
48Kapur, 1986:22.
49Kapur, 1986:44.
50Kapur, 1986:45
51 Joshi, Chand, Bhindranwale: Myth or Reality. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House,
1984:42.
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politics and vice versa, and that the key religious agency of the Sikhs, the
Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhandhak Committe (SGPC), has definite and
clear involvements with the Akali Dal amongst other Sikh political parties.
The Roots of the Secessionist Movement under British Pulp
After two Anglo-Indian wars in 1849, the British finally annexed
Punjab, its final conquest in the subcontinent. Although the British
conquered the Sikhs they recognized the important relationship between
military excellence and the religion and they therefore absorbed them in the
British army. This proved to be an excellent forethought because in 1857,
during the “Sepoy Revolution" in India, while most of the country rebelled
against the British, the Sikhs remained faithful to them. This was perhaps a
decisive factor for British victory in the mutiny. In return for such services
rendered, the British granted the Sikhs generous tracts of land, set up an
excellent administration where the Sikhs were concentrated, and created the
state of Punjab. The Sikhs were a major and important force within the
British army, and although they comprised only 2% of the population of
undivided India, they constituted about 20%-30% of the Indian armed
services.52
In accord with their well tested "Divide and Rule" strategy, the British
purposely gave special privileges to the Sikhs so as to ensure their loyalty.
This can be seen by the fact that though the Sikhs comprised only 2% of the
total population, they comprised almost 20-30% of the army. As argued by
Horowitz,
"colonial military recruitment was initially not merely an aspect of the
running of a politically neutral bureaucratic machine. Rather, recruitment
52Singh, Rahul, "Sikh India; the roots of the Punjab violence". The New Republic, July 16,
1984, v.191:13.
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was heavily imbued with ethnic stereotypes
,
and was one of the most
important arenas for the working out of colonial ethnic policy. At the
broadest level, therefore, the transfer of military institutions to new states
bequeathed to them instruments of force that were very much a part of
ethnic politics.''53
The intention of the British was clearly to create a "martial" race
which would remain faithful to the British. In fact, to be recruited as a Sikh,
the Sikh had to be a keshadhari Sikh, who was a member of the Khalsa and
was compelled to maintain and observe the tenets of the Khalsa.54 Other
benefits included giving the Sikhs special economic benefits and
opportunities to develop, thus consistently ameliorating the distinct identity
of the British.
Such bliss with the British tended to be shortlived after the infamous
"Jallianwala Bagh" massacre, where in 1919, under the command of British
Brigadier General Reginald Dyer, approximately 379 Sikhs were killed. A
large gathering of Sikhs were fired at although they were peacefully gathered
because there was an order which prohibited the assembly of more than a
few persons. This massacre played a crucial role in the unity of all the groups
in India against the British, particularly and most importantly the Sikhs who
had remained faithful to the British through all these years.55 Tragically,
General Dyer was feted instead of reprimanded, and this infuriated the Sikhs
and made them unite with the rest of India. Adding fuel to the fire was the
fact that the Sikh priests collaborated with the British and did nothing to
condemn the General. Furious, the Sikhs agitated for the reform of the Sikh
gurudwaras, and it was the result of this agitation that the Shiromani
Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee (SGPC) and the Akali Dal were formed.
^Horowitz, Donald L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict.Berkelev: Univ of California Press,1987:527.
54Kapur, 1986:15.
55Kapur, 1986:13.
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While the former was created to manage the newly liberated Golden Temple
which was won over from the British, a little while later, the latter, served as
the major Sikh political party56
.
Post Independence
As independence approached, the Sikhs were torn. They faced a
choice. They could either go with Pakistan, or they could stay with India.
Following Muhammand Ali Jinnah’s declaration in 1940 to the Muslim
League in Lahore that it was clear that Jinnah was clearly interested in a
Muslim Pakistan.
"Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the strict sense of the word , but in
fact different and distinct social orders
,
and it is only a dream that Hindus
and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality ...”
,
There would be no place for other religions in this new nation.
However, India which was calling for a secular existence, offered a shelter for
the Sikhs. If the Sikhs had insisted on their own state, they feared that they
would have to fight Pakistan alone, since Pakistan had also laid claim to the
Punjab, where the Muslims were the largest community. Subsequently the
fate of the Punjab was decided by "Stafford Cripps Commission"57 which
divided the Punjab into the Indian Punjab (the East part) and the Pakistani
Punjab (the West part).58
56Tully, Mark & Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs.Gandhi's Last Battle. London: Pan Books,
1986:30-31.
57This Commission was set up by Lord Mountbatten who was sent by the Queen to handle the
transition of the Indian subcontinent to home rule.
58CO Brien, Conor Cruise, "Holy War Against India", The Atlantic, Aug 1988, v.262:61.
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Historical Fear of Hinduism
One major factor which consistently troubled the Sikhs was the fear
that their religion would be enveloped by Hinduism. Hinduism tends to be
an enveloping religion. Since the first Guru, Guru Nanak was a Hindu, then
by Hindu token, Sikhism could become a mere offshoot of Hinduism,
therefore not a religion independent of Hinduism.
The first major threat to Sikhism was the creation of the "An/a
Samaj" in 1875 under Swami Dayanand. This body was an attempt to
revitalise Hinduism. The appeal of the Arya Samaj proved particularly
important for the Punjabi Hindu society who now turned to it, thus
ameliorating the differences between the Sikhs and the Punjabi Hindus.
This rise of the Arya Samaj was seen to be intrusive into the Sikh way
of life since the former and the latter had a lot in common including
forbidding idol worship, caste system, child marriage and the remarriage of
widows.59 However the Sikh distrust of the Hindu had already been sown..
Even an observer, the Governor General of India, Lord Dalhousie stated, as
early as in 1849,
"The Sikhs are gradually relapsing into Hindooism, and even when they
continue
,
Sikhs, they are yearly Hindooified more and more."60
This fear of being absorbed into Hinduism along with the trauma of
partition marked the beginning of a Sikh demand for a distinct land and
community of their own. As early as February 1948, Master Tara Singh, a
prominent Sikh leader demanded, "we want to have a province where we
can safeguard our culture and our tradition "
.
61
59Kapur, 1986:20-22.
60Kapur, 1986:9
61Kapur, 1986,:210
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A demand for a Sikh majority state within the Indian union was
submitted by the Sikh members of the Punjab legislative assembly to the
Constituent Assembly, which was responsible for framing the constitution of
independent India. This memorandum had two requests. The first one
demanded that there would he special communal representation for the
Sikhs to the extent of 50% in the Punjab legislature
,
and 40% in the
Government services The second was that if the above was not
permissible, the "Sikhs should be permitted to form a separate province
comprising the districts in which they were a majority." 62 The Constituent
Assembly refused to grant either of the demands.
In addition to not granting their demands, Nehru had also decided
that Amrtisar, the second major city of the Punjab, (Lahore had been taken by
Pakistan), was too close to the Pakistani border to be a capital of an Indian
state. A new city, Chandigarh was constructed on the banks of an artificial
lake with the beautiful and panoramic sight of the Simla Hills.63
Subsequently, in 1952, the Akali Dal brought up the issue once again.
They realized a division of Punjab among communal lines would not be
acceptable to the Government, particularly Jawaharlal Nehru. They now
cloaked it in the demands for a state based on languauge. In 1953, Pandit
Nehru, had set up the "States Reorganisation Commission" to consider
demands made by other states to draw state boundaries based on language.
The Akali Dal urged the formation of a "Punjabi Suba" which united all the
Punjabi speaking areas. However, this proved to be a faulty way of obtaining
the separate Punjab, because although the majority of the Punjabis (both
Hindus and Sikhs) spoke Punjabi, the Akalis wanted the state's language to
62Kapur, 1986:210
63Tully & Jacob, 1986:44
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be written in the Gurumukhi script, which was purely understood by the
Sikhs, and drawn up by the second Guru for the Sikh scriptures. Using this
reason. Pandit Nehru declared that the call for a separate Punjabi Suba was
not based on linguistic needs, but along communal lines, and the demand
for the Punjabi Suba was rejected.64 On the behalf of the Sikhs, Master Tara
Singh continued the agitation. "The Muslims got Pakistan, the Hindus got
India, and we got nothing"65 was the nebulous cry for a Sikh homeland. On
24 January 1960, 132 members of the SGPC took an oath to give their tan
(body), man (soul) and dhan (wealth) for the Punjabi Suba. Tara Singh also
began a fast unto death. As he said, "7 do not want to die, but while living I
do not want to see the Sikh Panth insulted and the Sikhs treated as inferior
to other communities.". Ultimately, the fast was called off after 43 days, and
the schoolmaster from Rawalpindi district was called to trial before the Akal
Takht. This was the end of his political career.66
However, the important effect that this agitation had on the Sikh
psyche is the apparent betrayal by the Punjabi Hindus who fearful of Sikh
domination, and under the organization of the Arya Samaj, declared their
language to be Hindi and not Punjabi. This prevented the creation of a
Punjabi state in the 1950s. When the rest of India was carved out during the
linguistic organization of states, the Punjabi Sikhs never forgave the Punjabi
Hindus for this apparent betrayal, although in 1966, Punjab was in fact
divided into the subsequent state of Punjab (where Punjabi was the
dominant language) and Haryana, the political distrust of Punjab Hindus
was already latent.67
64Tully & Jacob, 1986:214-215.
65Singh, 1984:13.
66Tully & Jacob, 1986:40-42.
67Kohli, Atul, Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governab ility,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990:358.
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The leadership of the Akali Dal passed on to Sant Fateh Singh, a Jat
leader. (The Jat community was the peasant caste which was dominant in
the east of Punjab.) Sant Fateh Singh following the trend set by Master Tara
Singh, announced that he would undertake yet another fast for the Punjabi
Suba, and if that would not succeed, would commit self-immolation.
However, this fast was postponed after an agreement with the government
to appoint a sub committee to resolve the issue. 68 Subsequently, the state's
boundaries were redrawn in 1966. This resulted in now the Sikhs occuping
the majority 60% of the population, the Hindus; 38%. With these changes,
the traditional balance of power shifted away from the Hindus in favor of the
Sikhs. However, the shift was not that decisive to guarantee the political
dominance of the Akali Dal. This is a key factor bcause this resulted in a
fierce competition between the Akali Dal and the Congress for seats in the
Punjab.69 As will be shown later, this is one of the reasons for the
exacerbation of the Punjab conflict. It has been also been suggested that both
Master Tara Singh, and Sant Fateh Singh, though pursuing the same
objective of creating a Sikh majority state, used different means to try and
achieve the same end. Master Tara Singh had no doubts that the Punjabi
Suba, which he desired, would be a Sikh-majority province, and that the
Sikhs had a right to self-determination, which was denied to them by the
Congress in 1947, and ever since. Sant Fateh Singh, on the other hand,
rallied that the demand for the Punjabi Suba was not a religious demand, but
merely a linguistic demand, much like the demands of the other states in
India. 70
68Singh, 1984:216-217
69Major, Andrew, "Sikh Ethno-Nationalism" in Jim Masselos, Struggling and Ruling, New
Delhi: Sterling Publishers Ltd, 1987:172.
70Brass, Paul R., "Punjab Crisis and Unity of India", in Atul Kohli, India's Democracy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988:177.
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Clearly, the above section has shown that even before the rule of
Indira Gandhi, there were problems in the Punjab situation. However, the
commitment of the Indian leaders such as Nehru was toward secular,
democratic politics. Therefore, although the problem does have historical
roots, dating to the years following independence, the crisis did not take on
the massive proportions it has since the rule of Indira Gandhi. Indira
Gandhi's centralizing drive, and her power politics, has perhaps been the
sole and most potent factor in the exacerbation of the Punjab crisis.
Explosion of the Crisis Under Indira Gandhi's Rule: The Centralizing Drive
The issue was further postponed following the outbreak of the second
Indo-Pakistan war in 1965. In the meantime, the leadership of the Congress
changed with the death of Pandit Nehru. Power shifted to the hands of his
daughter - Indira Gandhi, who was to play a pivotal role in exacerbating the
Punjab conflict. Mrs.Gandhi granted the Sikhs what her father had denied
them throughout the years since independence. Scholars such as Tully and
Jacob (1986) argue that a probable reason she decided to do this, was that she
was influenced by the crucial role played by the Sikhs in the war with
Pakistan. 71 However, it can also be argued that Indira Gandhi was playing
power politics. She realised that if she was to maintain control of the Indian
union, she had to find as many allies as she could, since she was brought to
power not by popular demand, but by a group of elderly politicians who
could make or break her. Tully and Jacob suggest that this old elite of
politicians chose Indira Gandhi to be Lai Bahadur Shastri's successor (who
had died suddenly in Tashkent in 1965) for a simple reason. They believed
that Indira Gandhi would be an easy puppet to manipulate, and this way
71 Tully &Jacob, 1986:42-43.
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none of their interests would be threatened.^ Als0j Mrs Gandhi did carry
the legacy of the Nehru name, and this helped her gain considerable
prestige with the popular sector.
Under Indira Gandhi, the Punjab State Reorganisation Bill was
executed where the entire state was trifurcated. The southern areas which
were predominantly Hindi-speaking Hindu areas, were formed into a new
state of Harayana, and the other Hindi-speaking areas of Punjab were merged
with the Himachal Pradesh. The new state of Punjab comprised of the
remaining areas, and had a population of 54% Sikh (9 million strong), and
44% Hindu. 73 Although Indira Gandhi did grant the Sikhs their demand for
the Punjabi Suba, she balked at the thought of alloting the beautiful city of
Chandigarh to either Punjab or Haryana. Chandigarh was to be under the
control of the central government but at the same time it was to house both
the state assemblies and both the secretariats of Punjab and Haryana. This
did not please the Akalis, and in 1969, Sant Fateh Singh planned to immolate
himself if Chandigarh was not given to Punjab. Hastily, Mrs. Gandhi
decreed that Chandigarh would go to Punjab, but in return, Punjab would
have to surrender the two areas of Abohar and Fazilka to Haryana. It was
claimed that the latter were the Hindu majority area. But it was a Hindu
majority area which was Punjabi speaking, not Hindi. In effect, the award
went against Pandit Nehru's stand on the alteration of boundaries on the
basis of religion. 74 However, there are also arguments made by political
analysts that by the way the Government of India had handled the demands
made by the Akali Dal, and subsequently, the negotiations which followed, it
was clear that the Center would not consider demands on the basis of
72Tully & Jacob, 1986:43.
73Singh, 1984:218
74Tully & Jacob, 1986:44-45.
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religion or communal identity by leaders "whom it considered had
secessionist inclinations/' 75 Besides, the two districts of Abohar and Fazilka
are in the heart of Punjab. This decision not to award these two districts
which were in the heart of Punjab to them makes little or no sense, and goes
to show the partisan power politics in which Indira Gandhi engaged.
Although there was now a Sikh majority in the Punjab, to the anguish
of the Akalis, they did not win any elections held for the Punjabi legislative
assembly between 1967-1980 because the Congress won the support by
making populist promises. This has for long been a practice of the Congress,
where they make promises directly to the people, perhaps promises they
could not keep, merely in order to win elections.
In the first elections in the reorganised Punjab, the Akalis formed a
coalition with the Jan Sangh. The Jan Sangh was a party with a largely
Hindu appeal. The Jan Sangh was extremely opposed to the formation of the
Punjabi Suba. The President of the Jan Sangh had actually stated, "The Jan
Sangh regards the Sikhs as part and parcel of the Hindu society ." To join
hands with the Jan Sangh must have been a bitter experience for the Sikhs
because this diluted their interests considerably.76
The creation of the Punjabi Suba was similar to opening up a
Pandora's Box, for granting one demand led to a series of events which
resulted in the current crisis. This is not to suggest that if the demand for the
Punjabi Suba had been denied there would be no current crisis.
Undoubtedly, there would a crisis, but one of a different nature. However,
the granting of the Punjabi Suba to the Sikhs was the beginning of a series of
compromises, made by the State, in its secular ideology. As already suggested
75Brass, 1988:177.
76Singh, 1984, p.218-219.
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before, the granting of the Punjabi Suba would have infuriated Nehru as it
amounted to granting land on the basis of religion. To Nehru who was a
firm believer in the secular rhetoric and ideology within the Indian
Constitution, this would have been abhorrent. Another point to be made
here is that the Center throughout the Punjab crisis committed the same
mistake: the rhetoric was always different from the action. Granting the
Punjabi Suba is a good example of this since secular rhetoric was violated
here. Clearly, the center has acted in a way which is purely self serving and
without a long term perspective.
Subsequently, the Akali Dal party gained momentum and captured
the elections of 1967. However, in 1972, the Akali Dal was ousted from
power since both the Akali-Jan Sangh coalition governments (which were
formed between 1967-1972), were wrought with factional disagreements. It
has been argued that the union of the Jan Sangh and the Akali Dal was a
genuine threat to the power of the Congress in the region. Hence, the
Congress promoted defections and splits within the Akali Dal to weaken its
credibility. It is argued that the Congress was directly behind the collapse of
the Akali-Jan Sangh coalition in 1972. It is also argued by analysts that such
policies were followed through the 1980s.77
Ultimately, the Congress (I) lost power to the Janta party in 1977, and
this time the Akali Dal formed a coalition government in the Punjab with
the Janta party. In the 1977 parliamentary elections, the Akali Dal polled a
higher percentage of votes than the Congress, and succeeded in capturing all
of the nine Lok Sabha seats. This strengthened the position of the Akali Dal
in comparison to the Congress.78 But, once again, in the parliamentary
77Brass, 1988:178.
78Brass, 1988:80.
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elections of 1980, factional divisions within the Akali Dal contributed to its
defeat, and the Congress wrested power of the government.79
The Anandpur Sahib Resolution
In October 1973, a document was drafted by the working committee of
the Akali Dal, which served as the manifesto of the Punjabi view on the
constitutional issues. This document was written in the Holy Anandpur
Sahib, where, the last Guru had formed the Khalsa, and thereby derived its
name, the "Anandpur Sahib Resolution." The resolution listed two
principles" and four "aims" with ten religious programs to obtain these
aims and approximately seven political objectives. The main grievances of
the Sikhs can be found in these objectives. The first objective was to add the
Punjabi-speaking areas which had been left out in the delineation in 1966,
including Chandigarh, Sindh, Kangra and several other places which were
important to Sikh history. The second objective was that in the new state,
central intervention should be limited to defense, foreign affairs, posts and
telegraph, currency and railways. In effect there should be a decentralization
of power with more power granted to the states.
By doing the above mentioned, the underlying constitutional crisis
would be resolved, wherein, the constitutional assignment of reserved
powers would go to the states. In a deeper sense, this was a demand for a
state of federalism, in the true sense of the word. Although India is
supposed to be a federation, in reality, it is quite far from the concept, in that
the Center holds a large amount of power. Subsequently, the desire of the
Centre under Indira Gandhi was to focus all the power toward the Center,
and anything which was seen as threatening to the politicians themselves,
79Brass, 1988:218.
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was instantly resolved by suppression. The demands in the Anandpur Sahib
Resolution calls not only for a "federal State in a real sense", but also
demands that "all states are equally represented at the Center".80 The
resolution also posited that the "Sikh religion was not safe without
sovereignty ". This could be interpreted as being a call for a separate
Khalistan, although a separate state was never formally called for by the
Akalis, before Operation Blue star.81 However, the Central government
distorted the demands of the Sikhs and maintained that they were seeking a
separate Sikh state, in order to turn sentiment away from the Sikhs.
There are several other versions of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution in
circulation, some of which can be found in the White Paper on the Punjab
Agitation . One version in the White paper which had been "authenticated"
by Sant Harchand Singh Longowal in 1977, asks for the "merger of all
Punjabi speaking areas to constitute a single administrative unit where the
interest of Sikhs and Sikhism are specially protected."82 This demand does
not seem particularly secessionist but only a demand of what is just in any
democratic country. In a democratic country with minorities, since the
majority often prevails (Tocqueville's tyranny of majority) it may often
happen that the voice of the minority gets subsumed. Therefore, minorities
in a democracy should necessarily be protected so as to be fair and equitable.
The resolution also demands the redistribution of the unjust Ravi-Beas river
water award given by Indira Gandhi during the Emergency of 1975-77.83
^Leaf, Murray, "The Punjab Crisis", Asian Survey, Vol XXV, No.5, May 1985:481.
® 1Gupte, Pranay, Vengeance: India after the Assassination of Indira Gandhi, London: W. W.
Norton & Company, 1985:127.
82Government of India, White Paper on the Punjab Agitation. New Delhi: Government of
India Press, 1984:6.
S^White Paper:6.
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Also included in the resolution is a call for maintaining the present
ratio of Sikh strength in the Army.84 a proposal by General K. Sunderjit
called for proportional representation in the army: if the Sikhs constituted
2% of the Indian population, they should occupy only 2% of the army
positions. Such a demand would clearly be abhorrent to the Sikhs who had
been reared to be the "military elite" of India by the British, and ever since
then have been holding that position. The resolution also called for
granting the "holy-city" status to Amritsar, and permitting installation of a
radio transmitter in the Golden Temple for broadcasting Sikh religious
hymns. The resolution also stated that the Government had shown apathy
towards the safety of life and property for Sikhs settled abroad and in other
states in India. It had also failed to name any railway train, the "Golden
Temple Express", it had not recognized a separate Sikh personal law, and had
interfered in the Sikh tenets.85 The above demands, along with 11 other
resolutions which call for equality in the social, agricultural, industrial
(economic) and political spheres of life, constitute the much debated
Anandpur Sahib Resolution.
A short analysis of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution is necessary
considering the importance of it to the Sikh demands. It is clear that not one
of the demands made by the Sikhs are unjust or unfair. It clearly represents
the fear of any minority in a country as large as India. The Sikhs are a
minority, and as suggested before, fear being enveloped by Hinduism, and
not only Hinduism, but also by the Indian state. The Sikh identity could
easily be lost in the large secular structure of India, and the Sikhs fear
^White Paper:73-74.
85Kapur, 1986:222-223
38
complete dissolution. Looking at their demands in this light makes their
demands more credible, and not based merely on secessionist tendencies.
Politics and Alienation
Going back to the political climate in the late 1970's when the Congress
was considerably weakened, the prevailing atmosphere in Punjab was not
conducive to the interests of the Congress I camp. The Congress I under
Indira Gandhi had to find a way to curb and divert popular support of the
Sikhs away from the Akali Dal to the Congress I. The best way to do this was
to attack the support base of the Akali Dal in certain crucial areas and groups
such as the rural Jat Sikh peasantry which was under the influence of the
Akali Dal, as well as under the religious influence of the Sants and preachers
in the Gurudwaras.86 In search of a charismatic religious leader who could
do the trick for them, Indira Gandhi and her son Sanjay found Jarnail Singh
Bhindranwale. 87 This creation of Bhindranwale, the terrorist, was solely a
creation of Indira Gandhi, and her son Sanjay. This fact has been amply
documented in the literature. Clearly, Indira Gandhi was fearful of losing
power, and saw the opportunity in creating a terrorist figure who would then
detract sympathy away from the more moderate Akali demands, and this
way she could retain power by dismissing both the moderate demands as
unrepresentative, and the extremist demands as impossible to grant. This
way she would maintain her electoral position.
This political ploy soon gained its own momentum and a leader in his
own right was created who espoused the concept of Sikh fundamentalism.
In Bhindranwale's opinion, there was much divergence from Sikhism and
86Brass, 1988:180.
87Brass, 1988:180; Joshi, 1984:4.
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this could have negative effects on the faith itself. So, he instituted a
fundamentalist approach to Sikhism, and along with it brought in the
element of violence into Sikh demands. With Bhindranwale, active anti-
Hindu, anti-India and secessionist policies were instituted by the Sikhs who
started to join his following. These fell into the category of the extremist
Sikhs. Several efforts aimed at reconciliation all ended in the same place
with no clear answer or solution.88
Sanjay Gandhi and Indira Gandhi, along with their leading Sikh
politician, Zail Singh (who was Chief Minister of Punjab from 1972-1977, and
was currently Home Minister) needed a cause and a man to divert attention
away from the Akali Dal, highlight the inefficiencies of the Akali Dal, and
thus gain power. The man they found, Bhindranwale, was head of the
historic Damdami Taksal. The cause they found in the issue of the
Nirankaris, the heterodox sect of the Sikhs who believed in the formless
nature of God. The fact that outraged the other Sikhs most was that despite
the decree made by Guru Gobind Singh that he would be the last Guru, the
Nirankaris started to worship their founder Baba Dayal Das. This was
blasphemy and heresy to the other (especially the Keshadari) Sikhs. A new
party called the Dal Khalsa was formed on 13th April, 1978, literally, the party
of the pure. The following week there was a brutal attack on a Nirankari
gathering in which 12 Sikhs and 3 Nirankaris were killed. The Gandhis and
Zail Singh had an issue with which they could discredit the Akali Dal regime
since it was “apparent" that the Akali Dal could not control violence in the
Punjab, and not even among its own people. Bhindranwale was the hero.
88Singh, 1984:13
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In 1980, Indira Gandhi returned to power, but the monster she had
unleashed had not completed its tirade. 89
The violence unleashed by Bhindranwale knew no bounds. The first
horrible political murder which was executed in the name of religion was
the murder of Baba Gurbachan Singh on April 24, 1980. An arrest warrant
was issued for Bhindranwale, but being the "puppet" of the Government he
managed to avoid being arrested. Zail Singh, the then President of India,
under instructions from and with direct complicity of Indira Gandhi, went so
far as to tell Parliament that Bhindranwale was innocent of the murder. The
second murder, on 9th September 1981, had more serious repercussions.
This time Lala Jagat Narain, the publisher of a Hindu newspaper chain was
murdered. Narain and Bhindranwale were outspoken critics of one
another. It was common knowledge that the latter had engineered the death
of the former. Once again, a warrant was issued for the arrest of
Bhindranwale. This time it was imperative that he be arrested, and he was
finally arrested in a gurudwara in Mehta Chowk, in Punjab. This arrest was
the beginning of the violence which was unleashed in the remainder of the
Punjab crisis, in the pre-Operation Blue star years. Less than a month after
his arrest, Bhindranwale was released, once again, with the help of Giani Zail
Singh. This time, he emerged to lead the Sikh community down a bloody
path, demanding Khalistan.90 The final straw was the murder of Deputy
Inspector General A.S. Atwal who was in charge of the police in Amrtisar, on
23 April 1983. As Atwal was leaving the Hari Mandir after doing his routine
prayers he was shot dead.
89Tully & Jacob, 1986:57-65.
90Tully & Jacob, 1986:63-70.
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Following the death of the General, the tension between two Sikh
leaders, Bhindrawale and Longowal, mounted. Harchand Singh Longowal
was another leader of the Akali Dal, and he was considered to be considerably
more moderate than any of the others. The faction lead by Longowal still
espoused peace and nonviolent methods to win their demands. However,
constant failure of the negotiations held between the Government and
Longowal not only demoralised the latter, but also delegitimised the cause of
Longowal. It also pushed him to do more drastic things such as call for
"morchas" or marches, and more violent forms of agitation as opposed to
the the more peaceful methods he had followed before. 91
The heat was still on Bhindranwale. He was still wanted for the
murder of Atwal. Bhindranwale shrewdly reacted to the threat of arrest by
convincing the SGPC President, Tohra, that Bhindranwale would remain
safe only if he was in the sanctuary of the Akal Takht. Tohra managed to
convince the Head priest, Giani Kirpal Singh, that the only safe place for
Bhindranwale was the Takht despite the fact that no leader was ever allowed
to live in the Akal Takht. Eventually factionalism within the Golden
Temple complex, between Longowal's men and Bhindranwale's troops,
forced the High Priest to concede to Bhindranwale. This was the start of the
import of arms into the Akal Takht itself. 92
Bhindranwale was relatively safe under the protection of the Congress
I until the terrorists started killing Hindus indiscriminately and ruthlessly.
He was safe despite the several murders which he authorized, and for which
he would have been arrested for had it not been for the protection offered to
him by the Congress I and the police. This protection has been documented
9Hully &Jacob, 1986:63-70.
92Tully & Jacob, 1986:108-110.
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by several credible sources, and is a well known fact in India.93 After a set of
horrible murders in September-October 1983, Mrs. Gandhi deposed the
Darbara Government in the Punjab, and imposed President's Rule.
Throughout this period, it is also clear that in addition to supporting
Bhindranwale, the Center did not want to come to any sort of settlement
with the Akalis. Although there were at least ten meetings between the
members of the Akali Dal and the Congress I between 1983-1984, none of
these meetings resulted in anything substantial because the centre did not
want to concede any demands, lest they be forced to concede all demands.
Therefore, they portrayed the Sikh demand for a separate community within
the Indian union, as a demand for a separate nation. By doing so, they hoped
to isolate the Akalis enough so that they would be forced into engaging in
terrorist activities, which would further alienate them from the Indian
polity. Therefore, the Congress I would seem like a strong saviour in the face
of terrorism, and would garner more electoral support.94 However,
interesting to note is that in the end the government conceded all the
religious demands of the Sikhs, and even went so far as to amend section 25
of the Constitution which guaranteed the Sikhs a distinct religious identity.95
This granting of religiously based demands, while ignoring the more
economic demands of the Sikhs has been a potent reason in exacerbating the
religious aspect of the crisis.
93Joshi, 1984:6.
94Joshi, 1984:75.
95Article 25 of the Indian constitution, until the subsequent amendment treated the Hindus and
Sikhs as one, and did not provide for different personal laws in terms of religious matters.
This was a matter of contention for all religious minorities in the Indian union.
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Operation Blue Star: A Fatal Miscalculation?
With the deterioration of the conflict to an all time low point, there
was apparently no other way out other than flushing the Golden Temple of
its terrorists, and arresting Bhindranwale. This was the beginning of
Operation Blue Star: the army action which infuriated every Sikh
irrespective of where his/her loyalties lay. This was sacrilege, for the army to
enter the Golden Temple and commit murder. Indira Gandhi summoned
Major General Kuldip Singh Brar, a clean shaven Sikh (offensive to the Sikh
religion), and placed him in charge of the operation.96
On June 4, 1984, the day of Guru Arjan Singh's martyrdom. Operation
Blue Star swung into action. The first set of commandos who were sent in
were all brutally killed, since they had little or no knowledge of the internal
setting of the complex. It seems incredible that an army action was carried
out without considerable deliberation as to how and where the counter
attack would be based. After almost 48 hours of firing, Longowal and Tohra
surrendered, and the dead body of Bhindranwale was located. Although the
Government had given specific instructions to use "minimum force" and to
ensure the safety of the Harmandir Sahib, the firing left much of the complex
in shambles. 97 Tanks had to be brought in during the operation because
resistance was extremely heavy and totally unexpected by the army.
Although army action started on June 5, after consultations with the
Government of India, tanks were brought in on June 6. The library was set
on fire accidentally. Lost along with rare books and manuscripts were
handwritten copies of the Granth andhukumnamas signed by various
96Nayar, Kuldip & Khushwant Singh, Tragedy of Puniab.New Delhi: Vision Books, 1984:91-
93
97Nayar & Singh, 1984:93.
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Gurus. 98 Ultimately, though the Harmandir Sahib was intact, nothing could
replace the damage done to the Akal Takht or other buildings. Casualties in
the operation were heavier than officially admitted. Although it was said
that only 92 army men were lost in the operation, in reality almost 700
jawans died. While the official figures of the terrorists and others dead
tallied only to about 554, in official estimates it is argued that the official total
was erroneous and the total number killed was almost 3000.99
The military action in the heart of the Sikh homeland provoked a
wave of anguish, and more importantly resentment against the
Government. The fact that the SGPC and the High Priests did nothing to
stop Bhindranwale from smuggling arms into the Golden Temple is clearly
not condonable. But thedisproportion andinappopriateness of the army
action far outweighs the indecision of Longowal, the High Priests and the
SGPC in allowing terrorism to fester in the Golden Temple. 100
It can be argued that Bhindranwale, a criminal no doubt, could have
been arrested in a legal way by the police. However, this was simply not
considered. Even if the police were sent in, Bhindranwale was secure since
he had fortified himself amply. However, the police had not arrested
Bhindranwale until now, although they had several opportunities to do so
because until the end of 1983, Bhindranwale was still being protected by the
Congress.
Obviously, since Bhindranwale had fortified himself with arms
(supposedly smuggled in from Pakistan), the army was required. However, it
seems hardly necessary to have had 2000 troops along with tanks invade the
Golden Temple. It was also highly inappropriate, if not downright stupid,
9
^Nayar & Singh, 1984:103-104.
"Nayar & Singh, 1984 :108-109
100Leaf, 1985:494.
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for the army to attack on a day when they knew that there would be a large
number of pilgrims celebrating the martyrdom of Sant Hargobind. 101 This
resulted in not only the loss of terrorist lives, and army lives, but also the
loss of innocent civilians as it became hard to distinguish between terrorists
and pilgrims. It also seems highly unnecessary that along with attacking the
Temple with about 2000 men, the entire state was sealed off with 70,000
additional troops. There was a simultaneous invasion of other shrines in
the state, a declaration of President's Rule and dissolution of the State
legislature, a declaration of complete Press censorship, and martial law.
Given the existing framework, it was easy for the Sikhs to perceive this
entire episode as a piece of evidence that the Government was hostile to the
needs of the Sikhs. 102
To add fuel to the fire, the detention of all prominent Akali leaders,
the declaration that the militant All India Sikhs Students Federation was
illegal, and the rigorous control of the Punjab after the army action,
infuriated the entire Sikh community. 103 It not only legitimized the efforts
of the militant Dal Khalsa but also sought to further undermine the cause of
the moderates. It also ensured a place for Bhindranwale in the history of
Sikh martyrdom, along with his right hand man Amrik Singh. Both men
were terrorists, and killed in the name of religion. Bhindranwale blatantly
encouraged violence between the Sikhs and the Hindus, and expounded on
communal hatred. He did not deserve to die a martyr, along with the likes
of Guru Hargobind, who were truly martyrs, and who died for a truly just
101
It is argued that this particular day was chosen for the attack because there was some
secret information that the next day (June 4), there was a plan between the Sikhs and the
Pakistanis to retaliate against the Government and carry out a large-scale operation. The
validity of this claim cannot be asserted for certain. (Tully & Jacob).
102Leaf, 1985:494.
103Kapur, 1986:235.
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cause. Indeed there may have been repression of the Sikhs, a fact that cannot
be condoned, like the power politics of Indira Gandhi. However, the tragedy
of the killing of innocent Hindu civilians by the Sikhs, and the subsequent
killing of innocent Sikhs by enraged Hindus (after the assassination of Mrs.
Gandhi) was analagous to barbarianism.
Clearly, Operation Blue-Star was yet another way Indira Gandhi could
retain control over Punjab. This action would make her seem heroic to the
rest of India, and simultaneously provide her with the ammunition
necessary to impose direct rule in the Punjab. Once again, Indira Gandhi's
lack of foresight, and power politics based solely on centralizing power, took
precedence over any other input. In the first place, Bhindranwale would
have never gained the momentum or support if not for the blatant support
of Indira Gandhi. As documented, he was created by her in order to provide
more support for her. Additionally, having created this monster, Operation
Blue Star was carelessly planned, and poorly executed. What Indira Gandhi
had hoped for was more power would flow into the Center, and into her
hands after this army action. Her short-sightedness did not allow her to
understand that the action would only seek to alienate the Sikh polity, and
was wrong, and unnecessary. However, Indira Gandhi, the self-centered
politician was to pay the price in the end.
Following the army action the same year, to right a wrong, yet another
wrong was committed. On Oct 31, 1984, Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of
India, was shot dead by her two Sikh security officers, Satwant Singh and
Beant Singh. There are no clear reasons given in the form of a public
statement as to why the two killed Indira Gandhi. Yet it is clear that these
two men were not driven merely by insanity. It can be argued that it was
Indira Gandhi's party which launched Bhindranwale, and granted him so
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many concessions that he became a 'Frankenstein' out of control. Not only
was Indira Gandhi the incensor of the phenomenal rise of Bhindranwale;
Satwant and Beant Singh were Sikhs and as Sikhs, they felt that they had
been wronged by her. "Raj Karega Khalsa" was their cry, and as far as they
were concerned, anything that threatened their homeland or their religion
was evil and their religion had to be defended. It would be a naive statement
to say that the two guards acted out of an impulse; they had to kill the
woman who had engineered the demolition of their beloved Akal Takht. In
their view, Mrs. Gandhi had come to represent a threat to their country,
homeland and religion. 104
This, however, does not justify the assasination of Indira Gandhi.
Nothing also justifies the subsequent killing, the violence that followed in
the aftermath of the assassination. Almost 1500 Sikhs were murdered, while
the Government and the police watched. The week following the
assassination, all Sikhs were categorized as terrorists and were publicly
humiliated, their houses looted and plundered, robbed of all their dignity,
and their rights as citizens of secular India violated. 105
The entire drama of the Punjab situation which unfolded steadily
post-Operation Blue Star amassed a momentum of its own, and was
subsequently handled poorly, at best, by the Center. Clearly as demonstrated
above, Operation Blue Star was not entirely necessary. The whole problem
could have been prevented had Bhindranwale not been aided and abetted by
the Congress I. However, given the inevitability of Operation Blue Star, the
killing of Indira Gandhi, certainly not justifiable, but clearly inevitable. The
subsequent anti-Sikh riots were handled poorly by the state, and there is
104Leaf, 1985:494-495.
105Leaf, 1985:495.
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substantial evidence to suggest that it was the members of the Congress I
which initiated the violence, and the police were instructed to allow the
violence to continue.106
The Rajiv Gandhi Rule: Post 1984
Following the death of his mother, Rajiv Gandhi assumed power.
Although he had a daunting task ahead, it was commendable that within the
first seven months of his coming to power he managed to reach a settlement
with the Akali Dal by dismissing, transferring or by-passing all those who
had advised his mother. After winning the general elections he understood
the gravity of the situation in Punjab and realised that this was a serious
threat to the very existence of India. He also realised that Punjab was a
political problem which required adept politicians to handle, not the army or
bureaucrats. He appointed Arjun Singh to take over as Governor of Punjab
and maintained direct access between himself and the Governor. He also
kept Zail Singh, Darbara Singh (the former Chief Minister of Punjab) and
Bhajan Lai (Chief Minister of Haryana) out of the negotiations since they all
had a vested interest in the crisis.
On 21 July, 1985, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal arrived in Delhi to
discuss some sort of agreement with Rajiv Gandhi. Succinctly, the accord,
which came to be known as the Punjab Accord between Rajiv Gandhi and
Longowal envisaged the
"transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab , referring of the Anadpur Sahib
Resolution to the Sarkaria Commission; referring to the river water disputes
for adjudication to a Supreme Court judge , with the assurance that each state
will continue to get not less than what it was getting, rehabilitation of the
106See V. Sharma, 219; Harji Malik, 240; Darshan Singh Maini, 251; George Mathew,259, and
A.G.Noorani, 273, in Amrik Singh, ed., Punjab in Indian Politics: Issues and Trends, New
Delhi: Ajanta Publications,1985.
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army deserters by providing them gainful employment, compensation to the
innocent persons killed in agitation;and extending the judicial enquiry into
Delhi riots into Bokaro and Kanpur." 107
The Punjab Accord was important because it marked a definite shift in
the strategy of the government. Rajiv Gandhi granted more concessions to
the Akali Dal than his mother had. This can be explained by not only the
different political personalities of Rajiv and Indira Gandhi, but also by the
fact that both operated under contrasting political situations. Rajiv Gandhi,
having won the elections with massive support while riding a sympathy
wave after Indira Gandhi's assassination was politically stronger than his
mother, and therefore he could put aside partisan politics in order to appear
to be the more benevolent political leader. 108 The major concessions in this
accord included transferring Chandigarh to Punjab, to adjust the river water
flow situation in favour of Punjab and to set up a commission to look into
the killings of Sikhs in New Delhi after the assassination of Indira Gandhi.
However, the end to the crisis was not at hand. The problems were
two fold. Primarily, after the promising start, Rajiv Gandhi's efforts also
began to fall victim to the familiar political pressures and desires espoused by
his mother. Kohli suggests that the problems faced by Rajiv in his
endeavour to solve the Punjab problem is endemic to the Indian political
situation. He suggests that the dual forces of institutional weaknesses, and a
highly fragmented, diverse polity force leaders such as Rajiv Gandhi to
abandon their electoral promises, and force centralization, and
powerlessness. 109 The second factor ensuring the failure of Rajiv Gandhi to
iO^Narang, A.S., Punjab Accord and Elections Retrospect and Prospects.New Delhi: Gitanjali
Publishing House, 1988:163.
108Kohli, 1990:365.
109Kohli, 1990:340
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solve the Punjab problem was the emergence of other militant Sikh figure,
including Jagdev Singh Talwandi to replace Bhindranwale. The problem
now was that many of the extremist Sikhs felt that Longowal had deserted
them and sold their cause to the Government by sealing the Rajiv-Longowal
Accord. After proclaiming himself to be successor of Bhindranwale,
Talwandi demanded autonomy for the Punjab, and launched a verbal attack
on Longowal. He charged the Central Government with genocide of the
Sikhs. Bhindranwale's octogenarian father Baba Joginder Singh emerged as
yet another new leader of the All India Sikh Students Federation.
Ultimately, Joginder Singh announced in May 1985 that he was unilaterally
dissolving both the factions of the Akali Dal and forming the United Akali
Dal. This United Akali Dal was plagued with conflicts and resulted in more
violence. 110 Therefore, increased terrorism, subsequent repression and
factionalism were factors which ensured that the State could not enact the
Accord.
The United Akali Dal declared that Longowal was a traitor to the
Panth for his unilateral discussions with the Government. There was
growing dissension between the Longowal supporters and the United Akali
Dal under Joginder Singh. Meanwhile, elections were announced for the 117
member Punjab legislative assembly, and for the 13 Lok Sabha seats. The
United Akali Dal stated that it would boycott the elections, but Longowal
managed to convince Badal and Tohra to support the Akali Dal's election
effort. On 20 August 1985, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal was assassinated
by Sikh extremists. 111
110Kapur, 1986:240-242.
mKapur, 1986:244-245.
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The Punjab Accord between Rajiv Gandhi and Longowal was a key
event in that it brought peace back to the state if only for a short while. The
terrorist forces were held in check and the Government had time to retrace
its thinking. But with the assassination of Longowal, and then the Head
Priest of the Golden Temple while within the four walls of the Temple itself,
violence was brought back into the problem. Subsequently, the pro-
Bhindranwale group reoccupied the temple, and the terrorist forces were
back in action. Additionally, increased political pressures on Raji to protect
the electoral interests of the Congress ensured that Rajiv could not translate
the Accord into action.
Following the assassination of Longowal, in a sympathy wave which
turned out to be beneficial for his party, Akali Dal under Surjit Singh Barnala
won the elections. The polling on September 25, 1985 showed the voter
turnout to be about 67%. The Akali Dal won a clear majority in the
assembly, winning 73 seats out of the 100 in the 117 seat legislative assembly.
112 This clear victory by Surjit Singh Barnala seemed to show the victory of
the moderates over the extremists. Although there was euphoria over the
factor that the Akali Dal had finally managed to win elections in the Punjab
without being in a coalition, there was major factionalism and dissension
within the party. Eventually the Akali Dal Government lost the support of
Badal, but retained the support of Barnala and Tohra. 113
Besides a power struggle within the Akali Dal, the party had the
unenviable task of bringing peace to the Punjab. This it could not do because
it faced major opposition from both the United Akali Dal, and the All India
Sikh Students Federation. The latter went so far as to say.
mNarang, 1988:168.
113Kapur, 1986:249.
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the emergence of the Barnala Government is not because of the traitorous
acts of Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, but because of the policies of Sant
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and the continuous struggle of his
supporters.
" 114
This was not the end of the crisis. The extremist United Akali Dal and
the AISSF began to indulge in terrorist and extremist activities once again.
This led to the ultimate dismissal of the Barnala Government only 21
months after being elected into power. President's Rule was imposed in
Punjab on May 11, 1987 only 1 year, 7 months and 16 days after Barnala seized
the electorate. 115 However, this did not signify the end of the violence. The
violence escalated and in 1990 the total lives lost were 3,650.116
The Current Situation
After a long period of President's rule, (almost 5 years), following an
extension of President's Rule in the Punjab almost 9 times, elections were
held in the Punjab on February 25, 1992. There was a very low voter turnout,
but the Congress (I) won a landslide victory capturing 87 seats out of the 117
strong Legislative Assembly, and 12 seats out of the 13 available for the Lok
Sabha (the lower House of Parliament). The Akali Dal managed to capture
only 3 seats out of 117 seats for the Legislative Assembly. Beant Singh was
appointed by the Congress (I) as Chief Minister of the Punjab. 117
Although free and fair elections were held, the violence did not
decrease even during campaigning. Despite the increased deployment of
army, 24 candidates were killed, out of which 3 were Lok Sabha candidates
and the remaining 21 were running for State Assembly seats. 118 This
114Kapur, 1986:249.
India News,
,
Washington DC, Jan 16-31, 1992:10.
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violence only shows the lack of credibility of the Government, and the lack
of faith the people have in the Government. Also these elections were
boycotted by most of the militant factions. Six groups led by Parkash Singh
Badal, S.S. Mann, Kartar Singh Narang, Baba Joginder Singh, the AISSF
group led by Manjit, and the SSF led by Mehta Chawla all blatantly
announced their unanimous decision to boycott the elections. 119
The Beant Singh Congress I Government has little or no legitimacy.
After six long years of factionalism, the six major Akali groups have put
aside their differences, and are working for a sovereign Sikh state. The
formalized "panthic bodies-militant nexus" has threatened to set off a civil
disobedience movement if the Beant Singh government is not deposed
immediately. As said by AISSF (M) General Secretary Harminder Singh Gill,
"The Sikhs will not only paralyze the administration but also force the
ministers to operate from the secretariat and circuit houses only."
The unified group not only demands the state of Khalistan, but also the
release of all detained Akali leaders, as well as all the militants. 120 The
militants plan to
"dissolve the panthic committees to form the united Akali Dal, erode the
state's write by reviving Khalsa panchayats and asking farmers not to sell
wheat to government agencies, use the nexus with Kashmiri separatists to
acquire arms, and select targets to widen the communal divide and scare
away non-Punjabis." 121
In response to the measures of the militants and the Sikhs the State
has its work cut out, but has not managed to curb or ease the problem.
Although the State under Beant Singh had planned to keep top Akali leaders
in jail and thus control the movement, this plan backfired with the Akali
Dal officially joining hands with the terrorists to gain a sovereign Sikh state.
H9India Today, Jan 31, 1992:42.
1
^India Today, April 15, 1992:26-27.
121 India Today, April 15, 1992:26.
54
The State has not managed to curb violence either, despite appeals to the
militants to eschew violence . 122
The Government meanwhile still continues to blame the "foreign
hand" in exacerbating the Punjab problem by supplying the militants with
arms. The argument made by many key political analysts in India and
outside is that while the major part of the problem with India lies
undoubtedly with the State itself, and its incompetency to deal with the
situation effectively, the extent of Pakistan's "logistical and physical support"
to the extremists has served to worsen the situation. The fact that the
extremists can look to a foreign power to supply arms has made the crisis
harder to solve . 123
The Government has consistently used the issue of the "foreign hand"
to explain any militant uprising. Although in the case of Kashmir the extent
of Pakistani assistance is clear, the Pakistani element is harder to prove in the
Punjab issue. However, the stand of the Indian Government in trying to
explain its apparent inadequacy in dealing with the terrorist problem in
Punjab is that despite constant efforts to flush out the terrorists from the
Punjab and rid them off their arms, new replenishments of arms are always
available across the border in a never ending supply . 124 This "foreign hand"
excuse cannot go any further since the crisis needs to be dealt with, and
excuses do not solve the problem.
Economic Causes of the Conflict
Although politics has played an important role in guiding the demand
for the Sikh sovereign State of Khalistan, economic factors have also played a
122India Today, April 15, 1992:27.
123Bajpai, Shankar K., "India in 1991", Asian Survey, Vol XXXII, No.2, Feb, 1992:p.215.
124Joshi, 1984:18.
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crucial role in exacerbating the conflict. What I attempt to do in this section
is to outline a few economic reasons why the Sikhs have been unhappy with
the Centre, thus resulting in their demand for a separate state. The causes
that I have chosen are by no means exhaustive, although I believe that they
are some of the important ones.
According to the 1971 census, over 10, 378, 979 Sikhs of the 8,000,000
strong Indian population were concentrated in the Punjab. By contrast,
Sikhs were a decided minority in the earlier census years. (They constituted
33.3% of population from 1947-1966).
There are clear indications that the Sikh majority in the Punjab has
been declining. As a consequence of the Green Revolution of the 1960's,
there has been a large inflow of migrants (mainly Hindus) from Uttar
Pradesh, Bihar, and Orissa. In contrast to the large inflow of non-Sikhs, there
has been a substantial outflow of Sikhs to other parts of India, as well as
overseas in search of a better standard of living, education etc. Paul Wallace
has claimed that almost one-fifth of the Sikh population lives out of the
Punjab. 123 Thus it can be argued that the Sikh affluence has its definite
advantages and disadvantages. Importantly, given the Sikh fear of
assimilation, the fact that the immigration into the state, as well as their own
emigration from the state may be signs of an erosion into their majority
position, is a reason which has catapulted fear. This fear has been mostly
promoted by and controlled by the Akali Dal, the SGPC and the various other
Sikh political parties. This fear has been the base of electoral agendas, that is
by convincing the Sikhs that they are in threat of being dominated by other
groups, the Sikh political parties have attempted to garner political support.
125Wallace, 1986:365.
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However, such communal based electoral campaigns have clearly been a
problem in maintaining peace in the state.
Being the bread-basket for most of India, there has been a clear bias for
agriculture in the region, thus neglecting industrial investment in the
region. Of total central investment in India in March 1979, Punjab's share
was a meagre 2.2%. There are still demands for increased investment for
industry, a larger percentage of the river waters flowing through Punjab, and
increased electric power. 126 The loss of the Bhakra Nangal Dam, which had
been built originally out of Punjab state development funds, was also a
source of dissatisfaction under Indira Gandhi.127
It has also been argued that unemployment is a major reason why
there is so much Sikh unrest. It has been argued that there is not enough
gainful employment available. To own even a tiny farmland is not possible
with the Punjab Land Reform Act of 1972, instituted by Indira Gandhi,
which limits a family holding to 7 hectares, thus preventing further
accumulation of land and empowering the revenue officials. This method
required the revenue official to aggregate all the lands of a family, and then
required the head of the family to choose for himself and for each adult son,
land up to the limit of 7 hectares, but none for the minor sons. By thus
diminishing the importance of the minor sons, the laws " not only violated
the basic concept of household order, but assured that the family holdings
once broken up could never be reaggregated.
" 128 Hence this law meets
much opposition from the Sikhs.
A major demand in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and all the
subsequent demands made by the Akalis has been the issue of the Ravi-Beas
126Wallace, 1986:372.
127Leaf, 1985:478.
128Leaf, 1985:479.
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water. The demands are that the majority use of the waters of the two rivers
in question have been given unfairly to the state of Haryana though Punjab
requires extensive usage of them for agricultural as well as hydro-electric
purposes. However, this issue had not been addressed despite the
agricultural success of the Punjab. These river waters have been a source of
contention first between India and Pakistan in 1947, and after the formation
of Haryana in 1966, between Punjab, Haryana and Rajastan. 129
Related to these issues of agriculture is the effect of the Green
Revolution130 on the Sikhs. The Green Revolution succeeded in
exacerbating income inequalities between the rich farmers who had access to
the High Yielding Variety of seeds, fertilizers etc, as opposed to the landless
and poorer farmers who did not have such access. The resulting economic
differences and several antipathies resulted in a discontented and diverse
Sikh community. The only way to unite the Sikh polity was by escalating
militant actions and separatist demands to create political unity in a class
divided community. 131 Major (1987) also suggests that the Green
Revolution succeeded in strengthening and modernizing "primordial
sentiments" such as attachment to religion. 132 He suggests that Sikhs, being
a minority, are more likely to be convinced that any sort of discrimination
against them is a direct result of the fact that they profess a different religion,
in a more "assertive and visible" fashion. Therefore, for the Sikhs, their
religion is a threat to the Hindu majority, and this being so, they are more
129Dang, Satyapal, "Punjab in Crisis" in Paul Wallace and Surendra Chopra, eds.. Political
Dynamics and Crisis in the Punjab.Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University Press, 1988: 414-415.
130The Green Revolution was an agricultural project undertaken by the Government of India
with Western aid which attempted to increase the yield of output by planting "High Yielding
Variety" (HYV) seeds, and with better inputs such as fertilizers etc. This project was deemed
to be a success by both Western donor institutions and the Government of India itself.
131 Kohli, 1990:354.
132Major, 1987:176.
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likely to believe that any sort of discrimination is a result of this.133
Therefore, the inequities that resulted from the Green Revolution could
easily be blamed on the state.
Yet another demand concerns the position of the Sikhs in the military
structure. Sikhs are still conspicuous in the armed forces, but the proportion
of Sikhs is conspicuously lower than that under British colonial rule. There
are a growing number of Indian officials who would like to see the number
of Sikhs in the armed forces reduced because of their "unreliability"
,
a good
example of which are the army desertions around the time of Operation Blue
Star. 134
These key economic factors are also fueling the drive towards the
demand for Khalistan. Clearly, while the Punjab has been the breadbasket of
the country by providing cheap food, it has suffered in terms of
industrialization and in terms of river allocation policies. It would do the
Government good to consider these problems while addressing the issue.
While using a political framework could potentially reduce the amount of
conflict currently, an effective long term strategy aimed at bringing peace in
the Punjab would include solving the economic demands as well.
However, the Center so far has not engaged in any policies to aid in the
industrialization of the Punjab as it serves its interests to keep Punjab as the
agricultural producer, and therefore force a dependent relationship vis a vis
the Center where Punjab would need the Central government for support,
both financial and industrial.
Pettigrew (1986) states that what was key for the Akali Dal in its ability
to garner support for its policies was its ability to place the various economic
133Major, 1987:176-177.
1340'Brien, 1988:62.
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and political demands within a religious framework. She suggests however,
that this was not a political ploy by the Sikhs, but instead was inherent to the
Sikh tradition where religion and the community social order were
inherently related . 135
Factionalism within the Sikh Movement
It is a common error among people in India and world wide to equate
every Sikh to a terrorist, for undoubtedly there are many power factions
within Sikh ranks. The Sikhs are all united in one demand: more
autonomy. However, this does not necessarily equate into the demand for a
separate State.
Before Operation Blue Star, the division between the Sikhs was clear.
There were the terrorists who wanted a sovereign state, and the moderates
who wanted more autonomy. In the context of the Punjab, the moderates
belonged to the Shiromani Akali Dal, which is the self proclaimed sole
representative of Siskh interest. The SGPC (Shiromani Gurudwara
Parbhandak Committee) which is a Sikh church organization is also a clear
moderate organization. The relationship between the Akali Dal and the
SGPC is extremely important because the former derives its legitimacy from
the religosity of the latter .136 The chief demands of the moderate Akali Dal
includes a rewriting of the Indian Constitution to allow for more state
autonomy, the transference of Chandigarh to Punjab, and adopting an
industrialization policy for the Punjab. It was only the constant denials of
these consensus based policies which resulted in the moderates making
135pettigrew, Joyce, "In Search of a new Kingdom in Lahore", Pacific Affairs, 1986:10.
136Major, Andrew, "From Moderates to Secessionists in the Punjab," Pacific Affairs, 1986:p44.
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narrower demands, such as the recognition of Amristsar as a holy city, and
the recognition of Sikhs as a separate 'quam'-nation. 137
The exremists on the other hand include groups such as the All-India
Sikh Students Federation (AISSF), and the Youth Akali Dal. The extremists
desire the same demands as the moderates, yet they differ from moderates in
the following ways, (i) They focus more on Sikh (as opposed to Punjabi as a
whole) interests, (ii) They adopt a more confrontational stance, as opposed
to the more negotiating stance of the moderates vis-a-vis the Central
Government, (iii) They espouse violence, (iv) Any solution would
necessarily have to include a strict punishment for those who have "hurt"
the Sikh religion, and restoration of full "honour" to the Panth. 138 The third
group within the Sikhs included the secessionists. Prior to June 1984, the
demand for secessionism was extremely limited. However, after Operation
Blue Star when every Sikh felt violated, the differences between the various
groups became more nebulous.
As with the people, the Akali Dal has been torn with factionalism.
The Bhindranwale-Longowal dissension was just the beginning of such
factionalism. While the latter did not endorse the terrorist activities of
Bhindranwale, it can be argued that the Centre, through its policies,
delegitimised the stand of Longowal. This pushed him to committing
himself to more militancy in order to retrieve some of the legitimacy lost by
him in an attempt to regarner the support of the people. Clearly, as has been
emphasised before, the solution to the Punjab crisis could have been more
expediently solved if not for the Centre's power politics, and the dissension
137Major, 1986:46.
138Major, 1986:49.
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within the Akali Dal itself. The blame however, lies more squarely with the
Centre.
Other factions of the Akali Dal have emerged since the death of
Bhindranwale. The latest reports from India suggest that six of the most
important factions have decided to join together and with the militants, to
pursue their demand for a sovereign state.
Conclusion
The Punjab crisis was one that could have been solved expediently
and with minimum bloodshed. Instead, the power politics played by Indira
Gandhi, in an attempt to increase her power base, at the expense of the
Indian Union itself has been substantially documented. The consensus
ascribing Indira Gandhi's guilt is overwhelming. Clearly, the few times
concessions were made to the Sikhs, it was the more religious demands
which were granted. For example, demands such as allowing the broadcast
of the Sikh daily prayer, banning the smoking of cigarrettes in Amritsar etc,
were all primarily religious issues. Perhaps the more important political
issues were either supressed or ignored. These issues include economic ones
such as an additional focus on industrialization in the Punjab, the transfer of
Chandigarh to the Punjab, the river water issue etc, were all avoided by the
Centre. Any solution which did not include these vital political and
economic demands were meant to fail. As explained before, it was the
demands of the extremists which were met more than the demands of the
moderates, for it was the religious issues of the extremists which were
conceded. This in fact negated the existence of India as a secular state,
because religious demands had no legitimacy and should not have been
granted. However, the more political demands, if granted would have
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guaranteed the legitimacy of the moderates, and alleviated the need of the
moderates to go over to the side of the extremists.
Additionally, Bhindranwale was clearly a creation of the Congress-I
under Indira Gandhi and her son Sanjay Gandhi. As explained earlier in the
chapter, the Gandhis envisioned Bhindranwale to be the contrasting force to
Longowal and other moderate demands. By encouraging a terrorist such as
Bhindranwale, clearly, the desire was two fold—to initially delegitimize the
demands of Longowal, and then having achieved that, disavow
Bhindranwale. However, this apparently ingenious and fool proof plan was
to be the undoing of Indira Gandhi herself. The force of Bhindranwale
acquired a momentum of its own, and had to result in the army action,
which then further alienated all Sikhs from the Indian polity. Clearly, it was
the power politics of Indira Gandhi which allowed for the massive
degeneration of rational, and politically-based demands into what has
culminated to secessionist demands and the cry for the creation of Khalistan.
Although the Punjab crisis and the unsolvable nature of it has been blamed
on Indira Gandhi, there are several variations of this accusation. The first
one includes the fact that Indira Gandhi was concerned only with her
electoral successes. Therefore, by postponing the inevitable action against
the terrorists until the eve of the elections in 1984 would portray her as a
savior of the unity of India, and therefore guarantee her success. 139 Another
version is the assertion that Indira Gandhi was an ineffectual leader who
could not solve the problem and it was this dithering at the head of the state
that resulted in the exacerbation of the Punjab conflict. This view portrays
Indira Gandhi as a weak and ineffectual leader. 140 The last version portrays
139Sheth D.L, and A.S. Narang, "The Electoral Angle" in Amrik Singh, ed., Punjab in Indian
Politics: Issues and Trends. New Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1985:123-35..
140Tully & facob, 1985:87.
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Indira Gandhi as a leader driven solely by power who overcentralized the
Indian polity and therefore promoted deterioration of Center-State
relations. 141 Ultimately however, it was the political conflict between Indira
Gandhi and the Akali Dal which resulted in the exacerbation of the conflict.
Such Centre state conflicts are not unusual, but the problem with the Punjab
conflict was the potent mixture of religion and politics which exploded into
the above crisis. The fear of assimilation, economic factors and political
errors resulted in the Punjab crisis assuming a far more horrific proportion
than was ever envisioned. 142
Kohli suggests that the tendency to blame the Sikhs is highly limited.
However, the one credible accusation against the Sikhs is the element of
their factionalism. This factionalism has prevented any meaningful
dialogue between the Centre and the state in an attempt to solve the
problem. 143 Additionally, another criticism of the Sikhs, especially the Akali
Dal is that when they were in power (for example, in the 1977 Janata Party-
Akali Dal coalition rule), they did not attempt to institute the demands they
made in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. If they were really interested in
the policies per se, perhaps the best opportunity for them to enact these
policies would have been when they were in power. Clearly some of their
demands needed approval from the Federal level, however, there were
several demands which were internal to the state itself which they could
have instituted. Their failure to institute these policies, or pressure their
political patrons into granting these demands, yet making them vital
141 Brass, Paul, "The Punjab Crisis and the Unity of India", in Atul Kohli, ed., India's
Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988:169-213
142Kohli, 1990:355.
143Kohli, 1990:355.
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demands to the Congress I after having and before gaining power makes
their position vis-a-vis the legitimacy of their claims a little tenuous .144
Violence has its own momentum, and this is particularly true of the
Sikh agitation for a separate, sovereign state, Khalistan. Tragically, the
central government, acting purely on narrow, self interested and partisan
grounds, has only succeeded in further alienating the Sikhs. Therefore, in
conclusion, while it seems inevitable that the only way to resolve the
situation is by granting statehood to the Sikhs, or by at least making serious
concessions to the Sikhs. However, this strategy is once again not the end to
this struggle, since granting concessions to one minority group while
repressing others cannot be justified, and will therefore result in a serious
wave of secessionist movements across the country, movements which have
so far been contained by repressive and totalitarian state policies. Clearly, the
state is in a difficult position. The time for concessions has long since passed,
and the state has maneuvred itself in a position where it has no choice left.
The only choice remains, Khalistan.
144Joshi, 1984:70.
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CHAPTER III
THE CRISIS IN THE VALLEY OF KASHMIR
Introduction
As is the case with the Punjab, the erosion of secular democratic
principles,and the centralization policy of the dynastic Gandhi regime has
been a central element in determining the course of the crisis in the state of
Jammu and Kashmir . 145 As with the Punjabi Sikhs, the Muslims of
Kashmir have had a troubled relationship with the Central government.
Their fear of being subsumed under Hindu India has led them to make
certain demands on the Central government. However, the Center led by
self-serving politicians, (Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, amongst others)
pursuing a path of power politics, have succeeded in alienating the Muslims
which has culminated in the demand for secession from the union of India.
This chapter is a historical analysis of the current crisis in Kashmir.
The following table is the breakdown of the state of Jammu and Kashmir
with reference to religion . 146
Table 1
Population Figures by Religion for the state of Jammu & Kashmir
Region Area (sq./kny Population % Muslim % Hindu % Other
Kashmir 8,639 52.3% 94.96 4.59 0.05
Jammu 12,378 45.3% 29.60 466.25 4.15
Ladhak 33,554 2.24% 46.04 2.66 51.30
TOTALS 54,571 100% 64.19 32.24 3.57
is no t the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir which is demanding independence from the
Indian union. Rather it is the valley of Muslim Kashmir which is attempting to secede from
the Indian union. Therefore, for the rest of this paper, I will refer only to Kashmir.
146Wirsing, Robert G., India. Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute. NY: St. Martins
Press,1994:125
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Clearly, while Jammu is predominantly Hindu, and Ladhak,
predominantly Buddhist, the area under consideration and which has been
the location of strife for the past 45 years since independence is the valley of
Kashmir itself, which has a majority population of Muslims.147
However, as in the case with Punjab, the erosion of secular democratic
principles at the level of the central government has been a crucial factor to
force Kashmiris to demand independence from the Indian union. What this
section will attempt to show is that it is once again the actions and excesses of
the center which have contributed to the insurgency in, and which have
formed a platform for the demands of secessionists.
Colonial Rule
The recorded history of Kashmir goes back to 40 A.D., but the roots of
the current conflict are securely embedded in the earlier half of this century
when Jammu and Kashmir was ruled by the Dogra dynasty. The Dogras
were a lineage of Hindu rulers who had been ruling from 1839, the last of
whom was Hari Singh who ascended the throne in 1925. Like his
predecessors, Raja Hari Singh openly favored the Hindus and allowed only
the barest means of subsistence to the Muslims.
This oppressive system continued till the 1930's when the first
glimpses of the eclipse of the Dogra dynasty came to view. A young and
enterprising Muslim, Sheikh Abdullah started to demand greater Muslim
representation in. He was arrested in 1931 by the Raja Hari Singh, but not
before he had set off other Muslim activists. Martial law was declared. In
1932 when Sheikh Abdullah was released he established the "All Jammu and
Kashmir Muslim Conference."
147wirsing, 1994:125.
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When the British Government could not ignore the situation of
recurring Muslim uprisings in the valley, a commission under Sir. Bertrand
Glancy was appointed to investigate the Muslim grievances of under-
representation and oppression. In February 1932 British troops were sent to
enforce law and order. Subsequently in the spring of 1934 the very first
election process was instituted, and a state assembly was set up with Muslim
representation. In June 1939, Abdullah was filled with a new passion to fight
not only for the Muslims in Kashmir, but vowed to fight persecution on a
whole. He broke away from the Muslim Conference, and set up an "All
Jammu and Kashmir National Conference." This was intended to be a
secular movement bent on effecting the Government of, for and by the
people of, irrespective of religious backgrounds. The three main factors
which governed his party were nationalism, an interest in left wing
socialism, and sincere secularism. Soon in Kashmir the Muslim Conference
threw out Abdullah and his National Conference. This resulted in the
National Conference appointing as its first President Ghulam Mohammed
Sadiq, who in turn locked Abdullah up because of a deep rooted hatred.
Subsequently, with the Indo-Pak war emerging, and with the potential
withdrawal of British rule from India, there was a period of political
vacuum.
In 1947, in the incipient stages of the conflict, India was still a colony of
Britain, but there was a strong movement for independence. The two main
actors on the scene fighting for independence were the Indian National
Congress, led by Pandit Jawarharlal Nehru and Vallabhai Patel, and the All
India Muslim League led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Liaquiat Ali Khan.
While the two were united in their demand for independence from the
British, however, they fundamentally differed in their philosophy of an
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independent subcontinent. While the Indian National Congress dreamed of
a secular united India, the All India Muslim League yearned for an Islamic
state distinct from the Indian dominion. Jinnah believed that the Muslims
of the subcontinent had a social, cultural and religious identity, distinctly
separate from that of Hindu India and hence were a nation on their own. He
argued that as a small minority they would be potential victims of
oppression by the vast Hindu majority.
At this time, the British had come to terms with the fact that the
Indian subcontinent was fast becoming more of a burden than a blessing and
decided to leave India. To oversee the smooth transition from being a
colony to independent states, the British appointed Lord Mountbatten as
Viceroy of India in 1947. The division of the subcontinent into the two
nations, India and Pakistan was to take place according to communal
allegiance; the predominantly Hindu provinces were to form the Union of
India, and the predominantly Muslim provinces were to form Pakistan. The
problems arose with the division of the princely states. Under the British
rule, these princely states were nominally independent, but they had to
recognize the supremacy of the British Raj. Now, they were given the choice
of acceding either to India or Pakistan.
The question of accession of princely states marked the beginnings of
the conflict in Kashmir. The British under Lord Mountbatten,
recommended that the Indian princes accede either to India or to Pakistan
based on two criteria: (i) if the princely state had a Muslim majority
population, then the state should accede to Pakistan, and conversely, if there
was a Hindu majority population, then the state should go to India, (ii)
accession to Pakistan by the Muslim majority states should only occur if
these states were geographically contiguous to either East or West Pakistan.
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Therefore, while for the most part, the accession of princely states were clear,
three princely states posed a problem. These included Hyderabad which was
a Hindu majority state ruled by a Muslim, the Nizam of Hyderabad,
Junagadh, which was also a Hindu majority state ruled by another Muslim
Nawab, and lastly Kashmir, which was a Muslim majority state ruled by a
Hindu king, Maharaja Hari Singh. Both Hyderabad and Junagadh wanted to
accede to Pakistan, neither were permitted by either the British or the Indians
to accede to Pakistan. Hyderabad was not allowed because it was located in
the heart of the south and clearly not contiguous to Pakistan, and Junagadh
was not permitted because it had a Hindu majority. However, Kashmir did
have a Muslim majority population, and had common borders with both
India and West Pakistan. 148
Post-Independence, and the First Indo-Pak War of 1947
Kashmir, under Hari Singh initially wanted independence. The Raja
did not want to accede to Pakistan for fear that it may mean the massacre and
expulsion of the Hindus and Sikhs, a situation which obviously could not be
tolerated. Likewise, he did not want to accede to India, because they felt that
it could imply the end of the Raja's control, as his power would be
overshadowed by the Indian Government. Lord Mountbatten is reported to
have asked the Maharaja on one of his visits, to forego his personal dreams
of independence and listen to the voice of his people. 149 However, the Raja
remained in a state of limbo for a few months before announcing on August
12, 1947, a standstill agreement, with both India and Pakistan, without
148Thomas, Raju G.C in Raju G.C Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict
in South Asia, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992:3.
149Birdwood, Lord Christopher, Two Nations and Kashmir. London: Robert Hale
Ltd., 1956:40.
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acceding to either. Pakistan signed this agreement, but India did not because
it claimed that it did not have the approval of all the people in the state.
India asserts that following this standstill agreement, Pakistan fearful
of losing its control over Kashmir, applied an economic blockade on
Kashmir to coerce it into accession. Pakistan violated the terms of the
standstill agreement and cut the country off from its supply of gasoline,
wheat, salt, kerosene, oil and cloth. Pakistan defended itself by saying that its
infrastructure had collapsed due to India's failure to supply coal to Pakistan,
this being the reason that it could not deliver goods to Kashmir. 150 On
October 22, 1947, there were rumors of tribal activism in the Northwest
frontier of Pakistan. The main tribes involved in this activism were the
Afridis and the Mohmand Maliks. These tribes wanted to move into and
help their Muslim brethren in distress who had been killed by state troops
for contravening orders forbidding celebration of "Pakistan Day". Hari
Singh, then sought Indian assistance to thwart this insurgency, and under
Nehru's orders and Lord Mountbatten's insistence that it would be illegal to
help the Kashmiris if India had no legal accession to the territory, therefore
India would only help if legally acceded to India. Therefore, on October 26,
1947, the Raja sent a signed accession to India following which India then
sent in a successful airborne operation to Kashmir.
The Indian and Pakistani version of this insurgency are
unsurprisingly contradictory. According to the Pakistani version, they were
not the sponsors of the insurgency; however, it was a spontaneous uprising
by the tribesmen in support of the oppressed Kashmiri co-religionists. India
on the other hand, firmly contends that the insurgency was created by
Pakistan, in order to coerce to secede to Pakistan. Nevertheless, this was the
l^Korbel, Josef. Danger In Kashmir. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951:69-70.
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beginning of the first war over Kashmir.3 It has been suggested that the
letter of accession signed by Hari Singh was post dated after the Indian army
had already landed in Srinagar, and not prior to the Indian army landing in
Srinagar as the Indians have always made it out to be. Secondly, the decision
to retain in India was a political move by the British who wanted to have a
safeguard against the threat of Communist China. 151
What initially started as a low intensity conflict along the Indo-
Pakistan border, resulted in a full fledged war. Pakistan occupied the
northwest frontier province of Kashmir, but the Indians stopped the
Pakistani army from proceeding any further. As a resolution to the conflict
,
the Indian Government decided to refer the conflict to the United Nations.
It strongly believed that a multilateral intervention in the conflict would
lead to a resolution of the conflict in its favor. Consequently, the U.N.
recommended to the Government of Pakistan to secure withdrawal of
tribesmen and Pakistani nationals from Kashmir; and to the government of
India, a progressive withdrawal of Indian forces to the minimum strength
required for the maintenance of law and order. A cease-fire line was
drawn, and it came into effect on I January, 1949. Also, the U.N. resolution
suggested, to insure freedom and impartiality in an eventual plebiscite, that a
plebiscite administrator be nominated with adequate powers to conduct the
plebiscite. Independence was not an option. 152
India and Pakistan both agreed to this U.N. resolution, but failed to
abide by it strictly by retaining military forces under various guises in
Kashmir. Pakistan then absorbed all the northern areas which it had
151Hussain, Mushahid, "The Kashmir Issue: Its New International Dimensions", in Raju
Thomas, ed.. Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, Boulder:
Westview Press, 1992:345.
152Korbel, 1951:113-115.
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captured during the war. The northern areas which were around the
Chinese and Soviet Unions' borders were administered by a cabinet level
officer, whilst the rest of Kashmir is in Pakistan and is known as Azad
Kashmir. Meanwhile, India absorbed the rest of Kashmir under its territory,
and accorded it a special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.
Included in this article are laws that only native Kashmiris can own land in
Kashmir. (This issue will be discussed at a later stage in this section)
Given the dramatic differences of opinion right from the onset of the
crisis it is no wonder that war did break out and there continues to be
problems in the Valley. The Indians stand by their position that the
accession was legal, and supported by both the Maharaja, and the popular
leader, Sheikh Abdullah of the National Conference. The accession however
was to be provisional and conditional, until a plebiscite which would
determine the future of the state. One of the biggest grudges against the
Indian government is that such a plebiscite never took place. The reason
offered by the Indians as to why the plebiscite was not held is on tenuous
ground. They suggest that according to the U.N. resolution, all Pakistani and
Indian troops should be withdrawn from the Valley before a plebiscite would
be held. But according to the Indians, the Pakistanis never removed all their
troops, and since they were the aggressor they should have removed their
troops first. However, Pakistan was afraid that if they removed their troops
without India removing its troops then that was not a fair position either.
Finally, while Pakistan's stated policy has always tended to support the
holding of a fair and impartial plebiscite, India, after initially supporting the
plebiscite, changed tactics, and has for the most part insisted that the issue of
Kashmir is not open to debate, and Kashmir was therefore not contested
territory.
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Ultimately however, this resulted in no plebiscite being held due to
the intrasingence of both warring parties. India continues to suggest that if a
plebiscite had been held right after the war, Kashmir would have legally and
popularly acceded to India, and knowing this, the Pakistanis refused to
remove their troops hoping to avert such a situation. The Indian opinion is
further reinforced by the fact that at the time the popular leader. Sheikh
Abdullah, favored accession to India, and given that he did, the masses
would have no doubt supported his position. Pakistan continues to hold that
it tried to its fullest extent to meet Indian demands.153
According to Wirsing (1994), it is hard to lay blame for the first Indo-
Pak war on either side, yet neither should have been particularly surprised by
the war itself. However, it is clear that India's intervention in Kashmir was
clearly premeditated and any statement to the contrary is false. However,
neither was Pakistan an innocent bystander as claimed. Leaders in both
countries harbored territorial ambitions about, and neither of them had
more than the "flimsiest regard" for the peoples, or the wishes of the Raja of
Kashmir. If aggression was committed in the time prior to accession, it was
done by both sides. 154 From the onset, neither India nor Pakistan have
allowed for the third option, independence for Kashmir.
The Second Indo-Pak War
In 1951, local elections were held, and Sheikh Abdullah and his
National Conference emerged victorious. Bazaz (1967), a well known
scholar in India, suggests that the alienation of the Kashmiri people began
under Sheikh Abdullah himself, who practiced undemocratic and
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intimidatory politics. Opposition parties were silenced, with the collusion of
the Indian army. Since at this time Sheikh Abdullah was still on good terms
with the Indian National Congress, he could rely on the support of the
Center. Therefore, it was the aim of the rulers to liquidate, and not convert
critics. However, simultaneously with these repressive measures, the
Abdullah government also engaged in several political and economic
reforms. It was hoped that such reforms would restore the state to normalcy
and they could abandon repressive measures. However, the suppression
made people more resentful and the more they opposed the regime the more
draconian measures were used to suppress the people. This further alienated
the people. Given that this suppression occurred with the covert blessing of
the Central government, the anger of the people was directed not only
toward the state government, but also toward the Center . 155 This was
perhaps an opportune time for the Indian leaders to stand by democracy and
uphold civil liberties and human rights in the state, however, their failure to
do so began the process of alienation.
This alienation coupled with the rising tide of Hindu revivalism
created sufficient concern in the valley of Kashmir. 156 It was this rising
Hindu fundamentalism and the actions of the center which forced Sheikh
Abdullah to do a volte face and turn against the government of India. What
was key in turning the mind of Abdullah was an incident which occurred in
1952. Encouraged by the rising Hindu communalism, the Hindus of
Kashmir, began to rise against the government and launched several anti-
government movements in the time between 1949-1952. Several Dogra
Hindus were arrested during such movements. However, in 1952, after
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pressure by the Indian media, a substantial number of these activists were
freed. However, none of the Muslims who were also in jail were freed. This
made Sheikh Abdullah realize that perhaps the ideas of secularism espoused
by the center were a farce, and he now started working against the
government. 157
New Delhi and Nehru were growing increasingly concerned with the
developments in Kashmir. At this time not only were events further
complicated when Pakistan joined the South-East Asian Treaty Organization
(SEATO) in 1954 which alarmed India because Pakistan now had support
from the United States in terms of arms and aid, but additionally, the
alienation and growing dissension between Abdullah and the interests of the
Central government were marked. India, at this time abandoned the offer of
a plebiscite because it claimed that such a treaty between Pakistan and the
United States changed the regional circumstances. However, how India can
make such a link is not particularly clear. 158 But some scholars suggest that
the reason Nehru withdrew his offer of a plebiscite was not merely to
counter this new alliance, but merely because of increased domestic political
pressures on him, which included the rise of communal groups which
demanded that Kashmir not be treated in a way different from other
states. 159 Simultaneously, the relationship between Abdullah and Nehru
had started to sour, and the latter could not count on Abdullah's
unwavering support. The Kashmiri people had started to turn away from
India, and more toward independence.
At this time, one of Abdullah's lieutenants, Bakshi Ghulam
Mohammed, with the support from the Central government wrenched
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control of the party. It has been suggested in some circles that Abdullah had
seriously criticized India's policy towards Kashmir merely in order to obtain
more resources from India. Some others suggest that Abdullah was truly
disconcerted by the actions of the Center and could not continue to support
it. Nevertheless, with encouragement from Delhi, which was still sore over
Abdullah's inflammatory remarks, Bakshi had Abdullah arrested, and seized
control.
Under the new leader Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, repression was
further intensified. Citizens could be arrested without grounds, and could be
detained for a period of 5 years, released and then re-arrested. In addition,
Bakshi created a Peace Brigade which was the vehicle with which to silence
the opposition, and imposed heavy restrictions on state press, ordained that
public meetings could not be held for political purposes unless they
supported the ruling party! Elections which were held in 1957 and 1962 were
rigged, and Bakshi and his men unsurprisingly won. There were also
several other measures to curtail the autonomy of the state which included
an extension of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, transfer of services
from the state list to the Union list etc. 160
Furthermore, with the dismissal of the Abdullah government, there
were many dissatisfied sectors in the Kashmiri populace. This led to the
formation of the Plebiscite Front. In order to deal with this situation, the
Central government introduced many repressive and undemocratic
measures by placing unpopular government at the helm of matters. The
Central government also engaged in a policy of appeasement in order to
quieten the people. The concessions included several arbitrary quotas,
permits and contracts. During this period, the Central assistance to
160Bazaz, 1967:69-71.
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Kashmir's Five year plan rose to 97%! Interesting to note however is the fact
that while for other state's central assistance was in the form of 90% grant,
and 10% loan, for Kashmir, it was in the form of 70% loan and 30% grant.
This would ensure that Kashmir would constantly be in a situation of being
unable to pay back the debt and set it into a cyclical dependent relationship
with the center. 161
Additionally, the center did not create long term employment
generating avenues for the population, instead, it continued to remain the
single largest generator of employment. These processes were set in place
through the large Indian bureaucracy, and this grew vertically and
horizontally. It also gave legitimacy to several undemocratic regimes. There
was a greater constitutional and legal integration between the center and the
state, and these measures lacked both political and moral legitimacy.162 It
was therefore a small class of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen who
controlled the society in Kashmir.
The actions by Bakshi were noticed with alarm by Nehru. However,
there was not much he could do about it, and therefore he remained
remarkably quiet since he realized that this was perhaps the only way to
contain the Kashmiri people. However, in 1963 when Bakshi made an offer
of resignation, Nehru seized the opportunity. The people of Kashmir were
now hopeful that civil liberties would be restored. However, this was not to
be so. Bakshi somehow managed to place his own protege, Shamsuddin, as
Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. This was however not to last for
long as finally under great stress, riots broke out. The immediate cause for
these riots was the theft of a sacred relic, the Hazratbal, which was allegedly a
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piece of hair from the Prophet Mohammed's head. However, the
mysterious disappearance, and then reappearance of this relic, incited riots,
and the government was overthrown, to be replaced by a new government
under G.M. Sadiq. It was hoped that under the new government, Sadiq,
there would be some positive changes, but instead the extension of Articles
356 and 357 to Kashmir further limited the autonomy of the states, and
angered the Kashmiris. Erosion of Article 370 occurred in 1964 when India
announced that Article 357 and Article 365 would also be applicable to
Kashmir. This eroded Kashmir's special status in the Indian union, and
therefore was viewed as a betrayal both by Pakistan and by Kashmiris
themselves. 163
This alienated the Muslims who now believed that India wanted to
hold them down by force. Additionally, the National Conference under
Sadiq was dissolved in 1965 in order to make room for the Congress party
(that is, the National Conference was to be replaced by the Congress party).
This further angered the Muslims of the state for whom the National
Conference held a symbolic meaning of freedom. The National Conference
had enjoyed glorious traditions, and evoked patriotism, and sacrifice.
Therefore, the abolition of this party alienated the Muslims even further,
and a peaceful integration with India was more and more impossible. 164
Furthermore, the games played by the center in terms of propping up
governments which would support the center made the democratic project
in Kashmir seem a little unbelievable. When Sheikh Abdullah was no
longer supporting the Congress, he was thrown out of power to be replaced
by the corrupt and inept Bakshi. Bakshi's actions, though clearly intolerable.
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were tolerated by the center until it realized that he was no longer of use to
them. Bakshi was promptly thrown in jail, to be replaced by Sadiq who also
supported the Congress. These moves by the center were key in alienating
the population and ensured that integration with India was become more
unattainable, as democracy looked rather elusive.
Various other meetings to resolve this conflict were held through the
1950 s with no concrete, peaceful resolutions being passed. Being constantly
turned down by India, the then President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan turned to
other strategies to capture Kashmir. He supported China in the traumatic
Sino-Indian war of 1962. However, more importantly, he decided that
military action was the only way to seize Kashmir. He formulated a plan of
action called "Operation Gibraltar". This operation was divided into two
phases. The first phase of the operation was commenced in January, 1965.
To test Indian resistance, Khan embarked on border skirmishes in a region
called Rann of Kutch in Gujarat. The Indians refusing to be drawn into a
war over such an unstrategic area, referred the matter to the U.N. However,
the end of the problem was not in sight. 165
In September 1965, Pakistan launched the second phase of "Operation
Gibraltar". Ayub Khan sent Pakistani guerrillas into Kashmir to trigger an
internal rebellion. As yet another cease-fire was being arranged by the U.N.,
this time India broke the rules and sent a counter-offensive further south on
the Pakistani border. Meanwhile, both U. S. and Britain, highly upset over
the deteriorating situation in the subcontinent, cut off arms shipments to
both India and Pakistan. After another meaningless and indecisive war, yet
another U.N. resolution was passed by the Security Council, with U.S.,
British, and U.S.S.R support, calling for an immediate withdrawal of troops
165 Ganguly,1990:60.
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by both India and Pakistan. In February 1966, a peace conference was held at
Tashkent, in Soviet Central Asia, under Soviet funding. This Tashkent
Agreement restored the India-Pakistani international boundary and the
cease-fire line in Kashmir hoping for an end to the long and dreary
conflict. 166
Peace was short-lived. In 1971, war broke out yet for the third
successive time between the two bellicose and uncompromising nations.
This time the issue did not deal directly with Kashmir, but involved
Pakistan's eastern wing. East Pakistan. India decided to help the Bengali
nationalists who wanted to secede from Pakistan. The war resulted with the
emergence of Bangladesh. Although this war saw only limited military
conflict in Kashmir, it was nevertheless crucial in further cementing the
differences between Pakistan and India. While India saw its role in the
conflict as merely "helping" out a distressed group of people, Pakistan saw
India's complicity as a direct threat to Pakistan, and the desire for India to
eliminate Pakistan. Certainly both sides do have merits, yet this only further
exacerbated the differences between the two parties for whom reconciliation
was becoming more of an adumbration than a reality.
Post-Simla Accord
In 1972, Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India and Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan, met in Simla, an Indian hill resort,
to try and settle the issue once and for all. They signed the "Simla Accord",
an agreement which is the basis for argument even today. The second
paragraph of the agreement stated that "the two countries are resolved to
settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by
166Birdwood: 1956:58.
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any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon by them." 167 While India
reads this paragraph to mean that both countries would resolve the issue of
Kashmir without a third party arbitrator, Pakistan insists that such an
interpretation was unacceptable because it limited its choices, and therefore
repudiates its national sovereignty.
Despite varying interpretations of the Simla Agreement, the period
between the Simla Agreement and 1983 was relatively quiet. Of key
importance in these quieter years was the re-entry of Sheikh Abdullah to
power. In 1975, he signed an accord with Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister
of India, who upon the death of Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri, took
over power. Abdullah returned to power after almost twenty years of being
away from politics. Having signed the Simla accord with the Pakistani
government, the Indians had received a guarantee from the Pakistani
government that it would not use force in Kashmir, and that the two
countries would meet again for a "final settlement of Jammu and
Kashmir." 168 This was the time for India to re-open negotiations with
Sheikh Abdullah, who signed an agreement with Delhi in 1975 that Kashmir
was a "constituent unit of the Union of India" and that "no law made by the
Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir seeking to make any change
in. ..the constitution of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.. .shall take effect
unless the Bill. ..receives (President of India's) assent." Also the Indian
Parliament would continue to have power to make laws to prevent activities
which disrupted the sovereignty of India. In return. Article 370 was kept
alive. Furthermore, the Congress Chief Minister, Syed Mir Qasim resigned
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and Abdullah succeeded him. This negotiation did not lead to any
significant protest in the Valley. Furthermore, elections in 1977, further
legitimated Abdullah s position, and he won overwhelmingly. 169
Post-1982
Such tranquillity continued and upon his death in 1982, Abdullah's
son Farooq Abdullah took over and won the 1983 elections with great
fervor. He challenged not only the Congress party but also its central
leadership. He was seen to be the beacon of hope against central government
control. In this way, Farooq galvanized the Kashmiris, and succeeded in
satisfying the long suppressed hatred of the central government. Farooq
aligned himself with national opposition parties and formed the Opposition
Conclave. However, this was the time of Mrs.Gandhi's centralizing drive,
where she sought to undermine several state governments ruled by the
opposition, and placed her own stooges in power. Defections were
encouraged. Since Farooq was not in favor with the Congress, and was
actually rousing popular sentiment against the Congress, on the grounds of
national security and in a display of power. New Delhi violated the federal
principle, ousted Farooq and placed G.M Shah, a Congress supporter, in
power. This happened with defections being engineered by the Central
government, and a group of twelve National conference legislators, led by
Shah and supported by the Congress, formed a new government. However,
in 1986, Shah was no longer seen to be in the national interest, so he was
deposed and a new accord was signed between Farooq and the Rajiv Gandhi
169varshney, 1992 :218 .
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government. He was then replaced again by Farooq who had done a volte
face and signed an alliance with the Congress. 170
These series of incidents were traumatic to the people of Kashmir.
Firstly, although Farooq had been popularly elected, when he was seen as a
threat to the government, he was immediately dismissed by the Center on
the flimsy excuse that he was a threat to national security. Clearly this was
not indicative of democratic practices at work. To make matters worse, the
defection of Farooq to sign a deal with the Congress made the Kashmiri
people more angry.
The events between 1983-1989 culminated in riots in 1989 with the
rigging of elections. Already disheartened by the turn of events concerning
Farooq, and the obvious disregard of the central government of democratic
principles, the rigging of the 1989 elections ended the tolerance of the
Kashmiri people.
Several Islamic groups had been in existence since independence.
However, they were not really a potent force in elections. For example, one
of the largest groups, the Jamaat-i-Islami had won only 5 seats in the 1972
elections, 1 in 1978, and none in 1983. 171 However, with the activities of the
center and the growing fundamentalisation of the Islamic movement, the
power of such groups was growing. In 1987 new elections were held, and this
election was crucial in determining the turn of Kashmiri politics. A new
group, the Muslim United Front had gained momentum. The Mulsim
United Front (MUF) was a conglomeration of various small opposition
groups. However, in opposition was the National Conference under Farooq
and the Congress. They successfully rigged the elections and won
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overwhelmingly. This disenchanted the people, and following lack of funds
and other economic problems, erupted in 1989. 172
The reaction to this blatant violation of democratic principles angered
the Muslims. Some of the candidates from the MUF then went on to join
various extremist groups. Later on that year, Muslim fundamentalists
burned the Indian flag, and called Farooq a traitor, and anti-Farooq sentiment
intensified with the suppression of these riots. However, with Congress
support, Farooq continued to rule without legitimacy. The sanctity of the
electoral process was at an all time low.
Interestingly, this was also the time when Pakistan had a military
revival. India's response to the uprisings have been brutal.173 The years of
1983-1991, according to Varshney (1990), was the time of abusive secular
nationalism,which led to a rekindling of Kashmiri nationalism. The
Congress under Narasimha Rao has managed to do no better than previous
governments. Political conservatives within India tend to limit the options
of the ruling party, and this has been no exception. Such conservatives
oppose any sort of concessions to the separatists. Within the Congress itself,
Rao is under jeopardy as there are different dynamics and politics of
dissension within the Congress. 174
India has increasingly suffered from internal political crisis including
rising inter-caste tensions, and the Hindu Muslim tension over the Ayodhya
mosque issue. This led to the eventual dissolution of the V.P. Singh
administration which had pledged a "military defense" of Kashmir, and was
unwilling to allow for neutral surveillance. In May 1990, thousands of
Kashmiris from Azad crossed over to the Indian side, and almost started
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another war, but this was also defused. However, in the summer of 1990
once again some gunmen killed a leading Kashmiri cleric, Maulvi Farooq
leading to increased rioting. This was further suppressed brutally by the
Indian army, further alienating the Muslims. Subsequently, the Singh
government was dismissed to be taken over by the Chandrashekhar
government. 175 However, no government has been able to handle this
explosive issue which has a circular politics of alienation.
One of the major impacts of this uprising has been the mass exodus of
Hindus. While the militants claim this is government-sponsored, the
government claims that the militants have engaged in ethnic cleansing so as
to have a complete and total majority of Muslims in the areas who will then
unanimously secede to Pakistan. Anywhere from 150,000-200,000 Kashmiri
Pundits have fled the Valley. 176
The Militant Groups
A very important set of actors in this conflict is the various militant
groups that are present. There are six identified militant groups, of which
only one is pro-independence, the Jammu and Liberation Front (JKLF). The
other five, the Hizb-ul Mujahideen, A1 Jehad, A1 Barq, Ikhwan ul-
Musalmeen and A1 Umar Mujahideen are all pro accession. 177 Active
membership is estimated at 5,000 while India claims that there are an equal
number attempting to cross the border. 178 It is interesting to note that out of
all the different groups which are present, none of them considers accession
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to India. Certainly, this goes to demonstrate the absolute unacceptance of
India as the country with which they desire to be associated.
Of the six, the first two, the JKLF and the HMJK, are the most important
groups in the Valley. The JKLF espouses a more moderate brand of Islam,
and is more popular of the two, but the HMJK is considered to be better
patronized by Pakistan, and is therefore more effective, and feared. 179 The
violence between the groups themselves has been troublesome and has
supplied India with numerous opportunities for playing one off against
another. New Delhi was however ineffectual in using the divide and rule
strategy as espoused by the British between the two rival groups, JKLF and
HMJK. 180 Irrespective of any other factor, one has to concede that the
militants, though voicing their strong views, are sacrificing not only their
lives for what they believe is a just cause, but they also take along with them,
the lives of an equal number, if not more, of Kashmiri Pundits and Kashmiri
Muslims. It has been estimated that somewhere between 150,000-200,000
Kashmiri Pundits have fled the valley. A total of 37,058 Hindu families have
fled the valley between 1990 and 1993 alone, with the death toll of Hindus for
the same period is about 350. 181 Given that these are figures released by the
Government of India, it can be surmised that these figures are probably
rather conservative, and there are probably a lot more casualties.
Causes of the Kashmir Conflict
Varshney suggests at least four factors for ethnic and nationalist
revivals. These include the fact that several ethnic groups cut across various
international boundaries, or spread across regional boundaries with another
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state. These groups when clamoring to be together are objects of national
repression. Secondly, partisan leaders reconstruct histories with selective
stories engineered to promote their cause. Thirdly, weapons of deadly
potential are in mass availability. Fourthly, the spread of informational
technology imparts a new emotional intensity
.
182 All four of these factors
apply to the case of Kashmir.
It has been overwhelmingly suggested that at the core of the conflict
lies three main problems. Religious nationalism represented by Pakistan,
secular nationalism by India and ethnic nationalism in the identity of
Kashmiriyat . 183 In addition to the above factors, some other factors which
have been suggested as important contributors to the conflict are the potent
combination of the heavy handedness of the Center, rigged elections,
Pakistan's involvement, and also a result of the history of separatist politics
in the state . 184 Certainly none of the above factors singularly determined
the course of action, but it is my contention that if not for the actions of the
center which have been neither secular nor democratic, the existence of the
current crisis in Kashmir would be seriously in doubt.
(i) Partition: The British Factor
One of the causes of the current crisis in Kashmir is attributed to the
time during independence when controversy surrounded the entire issue of
partition. There are many different ideas surrounding the British influence
during partition. Some scholars suggest that the British favored the
Muslims following the old imperialistic policy of Divide and Rule, and
therefore the British were directly responsible for partition itself . 183
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However, more popular is the view that partition occurred mostly because of
the intrasingence of both the Congress and the Muslim League, therefore
absolving the British of any blame and placing the reason for partition
within India . 186 Aside from the issue of partition itself, the way the British
handled the issues surrounding partition itself has come under considerable
scrutiny. It has been suggested that Lord Mountbatten was not particularly
impartial in the issue, and would have preferred if India retained control of
Kashmir . 187 This no doubt angered the Pakistanis who felt that such a bias
was unfair and detrimental to them. This made the issue of Kashmir a more
important one to fight for.
No doubt, the conflict even in the incipient stages was only part of the
larger problems facing India. The question of Pakistan's aggression in the
beginning is inextricably linked to the fraudulent accession which took
place . 188 Pakistan claims that long before the events leading up to the
Security Council resolution, and Pakistani troops had entered the state, the
people of Kashmir had revolted against the monarch, and created what is
now known as Azad Kashmir. According to some scholars, Maharaja Hari
Singh had no right to accede to anyone, either India or Pakistan, because long
before he had lost his sovereignty, when people in the area had risen in
revolt against him . 189 However, clearly this argument is on highly tenuous
ground because merely because a people revolt does not mean the ruler of
the land has lost his sovereignty over them. Clearly, this argument is not
entirely persuasive.
186piHai, K.Raman, The Political Triangle. New Delhi: Young India Publications, 1970:20.
187wirsing, 1994:47.
188Beg, Aziz, The Wailing Vale. Lahore: Babur and Amer Publications, 1969:156.
189Beg, 1969:157.
89
Additionally, one of the criticisms leveled against Nehru is his
apparent unacceptance of the very creation of Pakistan. It is alleged that
historically Nehru never accepted the two nation theory and was reported to
have said "one day integration will inevitably come. It will be in four, five,
ten tears- I do not know." Furthermore, he is supposed to have said that,
"Indo-Pakistan confederation remains our ultimate aim."190 This has for
long been a grudge against not only Nehru, but against most Indians. This
seeming unacceptance of the existence of Pakistan, threatens Pakistan in
some way. Therefore, since Nehru challenged the very existence of Pakistan,
and Kashmir was indicative of the secular project in India, it for long has
been a bone of contention between the two warring parties.
(ii) Cold War Alliances
The global cold war has also affected the status of Kashmir.
Conditions which preceded the second war between India and Pakistan in
1965 were different. By this time, both India and Pakistan had acquired
military equipment from the United States and the Soviet Union. Keeping
in line with cold war loyalties, the United States was fearful of Chinese
communism in the area, and therefore supported Pakistan by providing
arms and aid. The Western countries were fearful of the proclaimed socialist
agenda of the Indian government, and India was seen to be pro-communist.
Additionally, Western leaders piqued by Nehru's non-alignment
tended to support Pakistan and therefore did not support India in any of the
U.N Security Council meetings. Likewise, the Soviet Union, merely because
the West opposed India, took up India's cause. 191
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Rizvi states that initially Nehru's commitment to the plebiscite was
genuine, but he succumbed to domestic pressures as well as foreign pressures
created by the Cold war . 192 (This has been discussed earlier on in the paper.
For example, when Pakistan signed the South East Asian regional treaty,
Nehru believed that this treaty affected regional security, and therefore
withdrew his offer of a plebiscite). Therefore, the cold war was an important
factor in determining the continuation of the crisis in Kashmir. As has been
shown, the support of Pakistan by the West, and therefore, the Soviet
support of India, was a factor in the early stages of the Kashmir conflict, as in
the Security Council decisions, India was supported by the Soviets, while
Pakistan was supported by the United States. Additionally, the fact that the
United States was giving aid to Pakistan angered the Indians and made them
more hostile to reaching a settlement with the government of Pakistan.
(iii) Internal Politics
The existence and continuance of the crisis can also be traced to the
internal politics of both the warring nations. As far as Pakistan is concerned,
patterns show that most politicians use this issue as the crucial pawn in
coming to power. The minute any Pakistani politician shows any sign of
wavering on the issue (as Benazir Bhutto was often accused of doing), he/she
loses popular support. It may be then derived that one main issue of election
propaganda was the issue of Kashmir, and the more harsh the politician was
on India, the more secure they were of obtaining the popular vote. In
addition, Pakistan's historical claim to Kashmir, (based on the fact that
Kashmir's large Muslim population rightfully belong with their brethren in
Pakistan), forms the Pakistani platform.
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On the Indian front, initially, Nehru was attacked by communal
politicians in the 1950s. This reinforced Sheikh Abdullah's beliefs that
Kashmir would never be safe under India's control, and he started to lobby
for independence. This desire was further fueled when various sectarian
political parties which included the newly formed Jana Sangh, the Hindu
Mahasabha, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, (RSS) and the Akali Dal
joined hands with the Jammu Praja Parishad, another Kashmiri
communalist group to reverse Kashmir's autonomous status in the early
1950s. 193
Furthermore, over time, India's politicians have also been using the
issue to win elections, and using this communal war cry have succeeded in
convincing a majority of the Hindu population that it is imperative to
reconsider the special status given to not only Kashmir, but also to Muslims
as a whole. This has resulted in threats to the Pakistanis that if Pakistan
liberates, it runs the risk of hurting 30 times as many Muslims as it saves. 194
There is an interesting dichotomy. On the one hand, Kashmir is a
central reason proving India's secularity. Therefore, India needs to retain
Kashmir, yet, on the other hand letting go of Kashmir could signify a tragedy
of a greater magnitude, including a possible Hindu backlash.195 The
traditional argument given by Hindu nationalist parties such as the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is that if Kashmir is to secede to Pakistan because
it has a Muslim majority population then Pakistan must be willing to also
accept the other Muslims of India as well. 196 These internal politics where
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there has been a revitalization of the Hindu movement, (in contrast to the
fear of the minorities), have succeeded in exacerbating the conflict.
(iv) Center-State Relations
Contrary to popular conception in India that the current crisis in
Kashmir is motivated by Pakistan, there is sufficient evidence to prove that
the problem in Kashmir is not one of sponsored terrorism. Instead, one can
assign blame squarely to the Indian leaders who are guilty of "political
mismanagement" and "violence and brutality" in the state, which led to the
revolt. 197 The crisis in Kashmir did not occur because of any one political
event or mishap, but was created by undue interference by the Center in the
state. 198 The lack of democratic principles in the form of rigged elections,
communal politics and over-centralization of the Center has led to the
conflict.
There is no denial of the fact that there exists a corrupt hierarchical
structure of Center-State relations. As stated by Balraj Puri, "New Delhi's
policy on Kashmir has been vacillating from one extreme to another; from
complete trust of its people to complete distrust, from treating them as a
special category to treating them as colonial subjects." 199 The determination
of the Center in New Delhi, especially under Indira Gandhi, and her son,
Rajiv Gandhi, to obtain complete control, and subsequent regionalization of
states has been well documented. The Congress (I) under the Gandhi's
constantly forged questionable alliances with leaders in the states where the
Congress (I) did not have a substantial constituency. Evidence of this can be
clearly seen in the alliance in 1986 between the Congress (I), and the National
Conference. In addition, in the elections of March 1987, the coalition
197wirsing, 1994:115.
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between the Congress (I), and the National Conference rigged the election
process, and ruined the chances of the Muslim United Front. This trickery,
and absolute deceit convinced the Kashmiris, and rightly so, that the Center
had no regard whatsoever for democracy, and ethical practices, and were
willing to compromise the interests of the state for fulfillment of their goals.
Almost every election in Kashmir has been rigged except the 1977 one
and to some extent the 1983 elections. Additionally, until 1979, fundamental
rights under Articles 19 and 22 of the Indian constitution which guaranteed
basic civil liberties such as freedom of speech, protection against arbitrary
arrest etc., did not apply to Kashmir. Subsequently, the 1987 election in
Kashmir was rigged, and there was fraud combined with repressive tactics.
Article 370 of the Indian constitution limited the state's accession to
defense, foreign affairs and communications. However, other provisions
could only be extended with the concurrence of the state government.
However, this concurrence was instead installed though rigged polls. In
1986, the Governor of the state, Jagmohan, appointed by the central
government, "concurred" to extend Article 249 to Kashmir, which gave the
Parliament the right to legislate even a matter pertaining to the state, merely
on the resolution of the Upper House of Congress in India, the Rajya Sabha.
This denied the autonomous position of the Kashmiris as promised by
Nehru. To make matters worse, this was done in secret.200
This weakening of India's institutions (except the growing Center)
evidenced by the power politics exercised by the Gandhi regime, where local
governments which did not support the Center were toppled, the lack of an
effective channel of voicing discontent etc., , lack of a nation wide leadership,
200Noorani A.G., "The Betrayal of Kashmir: Pakistan's Duplicity and India's Complicity",
in Raju G.CThomas, ed. Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1992:272.
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and growing corruption have negated the existence of democracy in Kashmir
and have certainly slowed the process of normalization in Kashmir.
The Congress party which has also suffered several routs in several
state elections find it vitally necessary to somehow retain control of Kashmir.
The steady organizational decline of the Congress ensured that the Congress
ought to make inroads in states where the party lacked a constituency and
dubious alliances were forced . The Congress-Conference alliance of 1987 was
an example of this. These elections demonstrated two things. One, the
Center could at will take over the power of a state and had little morality and
would resort to unfair electoral practices. This was therefore indicative of
the lack of faith in democratic principles and federalism. Therefore, with
channels of democracy thwarted, the Kashmiri dissidents felt that an
insurgency was the only way they could respond to the Center's unfair and
undemocratic practices.201
(v) Religion: The Hindu-Islam Dichotomy
It has been suggested that Hinduism may be less of a potent factor to
hold various Indian ethnic groups together, as a religion such as Islam can
because while the former is a decentralized religion, Islam is a more
centralized faith. 202 Islam, is a monotheistic religion, which perceives itself
as the true faith, while Hinduism is a pantheistic religion, more of a
philosophy than a religion. Therefore, Hinduism is more inclined to the
separation of Church and state.
In the ideas of the founding fathers, including Gandhi, there was an
innate belief in tolerance and accommodation of other religious beliefs.
20)1Ganguly, Sumit, "The Prospects of War and Peace in Kashmir", in Raju G.CThomas, ed.
Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia. Boulder: Westview
Press,1992:357.
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Nehru strongly believed in the separation of church and state and saw that as
an essential prerequisite for any modern state.203 However, this all
encompassing nature of Hinduism has been perceived as a threat by other
religions which feel as though this acceptance denies the legitimacy of their
religion. This capacity of Hinduism to view other religions as merely
offshoots of their religion is a problem.
However, Hinduism cannot do to Islam what it threatens to do to
Sikhism, Jainism, Buddhism etc. Clearly Islam and Hinduism have been at
odds with each other ever since the Mughal invasion of India. The
proselytizing nature of Islam and its intolerance of the rigidity of its beliefs,
(such as in the caste system, idol worship etc.) have placed it in an
antagonistic relationship with Hinduism. In light of such factors, it would
not be a surprising fact if indeed the Muslims and Hindus of Kashmir did
not get along. However, ironically, in the Valley of Kashmir, prior to the
current insurgency, the Muslims and Hindus have historically engaged in a
good relationship. The Valley Kashmiri Muslims have been equally
persecuted by Muslim Moghuls and Afghans, and therefore, they were more
secular in their orientation, making them appear closer to their Hindu
counterparts.204 However, over time there have been many inroads into
this relationship.
However, at one level, the Kashmiri conflict can be divested as a
response to the waves of ethnic subnationalism that have swept over India
over the past decade. As recently as January 1990, the Kashmiri language was
stripped of certain key words, and replaced with their Sanskrit (an ancient
Indian language) counterpart. As stated by one political scientist, the roots
203xhomas, 1992:12.
204Thomas, 1992:13.
96
of the crisis in Kashmir lie in the Kashmiri’s people's fears for their national-
cultural identity in the face of the aggressive advance of the Hindu/Hindi
notion of nationalism in the country."205
(vi) Differences between India and Pakistan
It has been suggested that at the heart of the conflict is the differing
ideologies of the pre-partition Indian Congress, and the Muslim League.
After independence, the British wanted to create a confederal arrangement of
three parts - Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. This plan was formulated
under the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946. However, while Jinnah and Gandhi
agreed to it, Nehru was not amenable to such a plan, therefore forcing Jinnah
to push for his separate country, Pakistan. For Nehru, the creation of states
based on religious grounds was unacceptable in principle. However, for the
Muslims of the All India Muslim League, they staunchly believed in the two
nation theory for they felt that as long as they were part of India, they would
never be treated equally and would always remain the oppressed minority.
For the Indian National Congress, the two nation theory was completely
unacceptable not only because this would imply that the Muslims who were
left behind in India would always be aliens in a hostile country, but also,
India's boundaries would constantly be under threat if there were to be large
scale Muslim conversions to Muslim majority areas.206 This basic
fundamental difference between the Muslim League and the Indian
National Congress has always remained at the very crux of the conflict in
Kashmir.
For India, Kashmir is of vital importance for if it loses Kashmir, it in
effect would be admitting that its secular project has failed. The evolution of
205gN, Economic and Political Weekly ,March 3, 1990:422.
206Thomas, 1992:18.
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the identity of Kashmiriyat, which is a Kashmiri identity which has evolved
over a long period of time, and Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Buddhists and even
Christians have contributed to the emergence of this identity. This unique
identity has allowed for Muslims to exist in harmony with Hindus in the
Valley, and has also made them very different from their co-religionists
elsewhere. Similarly, the Hindus of Kashmir, also known as Kashmiri
Pundits have developed their own identity, which makes them different
from other Hindus in the country .207
Therefore, retaining Kashmir is of crucial importance to India to
ensure the success of its secular project. However, conversely, for Pakistan, it
also needs to prove that India's secular project is a sham to legitimate its own
existence, that it was crucial for the creation of Pakistan since Hindus and
Muslims cannot live amicably.
Wirsing (1994) is critical of the hypothesis that the uprising in post
1989 is "exclusively, or even primarily" the work of Pakistan.208 This notion
is however very popular in India. However, it is clear that once the uprising
took place, Pakistan participated and took full advantage of it. The incentive
for the Pakistanis to gain control of Kashmir had not diminished since 1947.
Particularly, in the 1989-90 uprising, there is evidence that support across the
border came in the form of arms, aid and terrorist training camps 209
Additionally, as has been stated before, it could be of potential significance to
Pakistan if the secular project in India fails for it would certainly legitimize,
and make more profound the two nation theory espoused by the leaders of
Pakistan.
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(vii) Article 370 of the Indian Constitution
According to Article 370 of the Indian constitution, Kashmir's
relations with the Government of India was restricted to control over
defense and communications, while other powers were vested in the
Government itself. However, the complete trivialization of Article 370 of
the Indian Constitution has been an important aspect of the exacerbation of
the conflict.
The Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), along with certain other key
parties (Hindu)have been trying to constantly repeal this article. In fact the
earliest evidence which supports this claim can be seen on August 9, 1953,
when Sheikh Abdullah was arrested. Subsequently, in more recent times,
the appointment of the governor Jagmohan in January 1990, without
consulting the wishes of the then Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah clearly
delegitimizes the special nature clause attributed to Kashmir.
On the other side of the debate, this privileged status accorded by
Article 370 to Kashmir arouses resentment in other states. There is an
overwhelming feeling amongst the Hindus of India, supported by the BJP
that Muslims of India should not have a separate civil code, as well as
should not have a separate Article to give it special powers not enjoyed by
the other states. On the other hand, the Muslims of Kashmir feel that it is
imperative for them to have certain powers, and control over their destiny.
This basic conflict over Article 370 is an important factor in understanding
the conflict.
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(viii) Repression
It is clear by the numbers and strength of the demonstrations by the
Kashmiri peoples (an example, on March 1, a million strong procession
passed through the streets of Srinagar demanding independence)210 that
they definitely do not want to remain as part of India. However, the Indian
Government in the form of the paramilitary, and the Indian army merely
suppresses these peaceful marches by imposing curfews, and indulging in
random shoot outs when these marches do take place. Certain investigative
operations clearly demonstrate that these authorities fire indiscriminately on
peaceful crowds of unarmed demonstrators. Every Kashmiri Muslim is
equated with a militant.
India's brutal suppression of the conflict is amply demonstrated by the
fact that India has deployed almost 350,000 men, including the Army,
paramilitary forces of the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Central
Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in order to suppress the revolt. Therefore in a
population of only 2.5 million there are 350,000 armed officers, which would
mean one armed Indian military personnel for every 3-4 Kashmiri youth.211
There are no state personnel involved, for they are seen as sympathetic to
the cause, and additionally, there is enmity between the forces deployed by
the Center and the state troops. Furthermore, the Indians have also invited
armed Israeli commandos.
A four member team on behalf of the committee for initiative on
Kashmir visited from March 12-16, 1990, to investigate the atrocities of the
paramilitary. An excerpt from their report:
210 Bose, Tapan; Mohan, Dinesh; Navlakha, Gautam; Banerjee, Sumanta; Economic and
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The team found, in the course of investigation, that these, abuses (ones of indiscriminateklU
l
n
S'
arbltrary ari
'
ests
' unlawful searches, unprovoked assaults on peaceful demonstrators
and the complete dislocation of normal life due to imposition of curfew for months together-
accompanied by raping, plundering, theft, and harassment) have been carried out by"the
official law enforcement personnel-the Central Reserve Police Force, the Border Security
Force, and in certain cases, by the Indian army. That these cases of blatant violation of human
rights were not isolated instances of aberrations, but operative extensions of an official policy
was evident to the team members..."
Almost all descriptions of the Indian army in Kashmir, as given by
foreign visitors as well as some Indians, report that the army in Kashmir is
one of occupation. The contrast between the situation in the Punjab where
there are some Sikhs in the army itself, and in this case, where there is total
and complete alienation between paramilitary forces and the locals is
obvious. The distrust of security forces is nearly complete, and this is
unquestionably reciprocated .212 The daily counterinsurgency operations of
the paramilitary only seeks to further widen this alienation. The
suppression of the revolt has been brutal, and has elicited international
condemnation of India's policies in Kashmir. Not only do the security forces
engage in legal judicial punishments for terrorists, but it is the extra-judicial
punishments which are truly stark. These include revenge killings,
executions, assassinations, rape, arson, and torture. This fact has been amply
documented by Kashmiri Muslims, Pakistani observers, and most
importantly, by both Indian and foreign human rights groups .213
The Government response and control of such atrocities has been
abysmal and this government inaction amounts to government sponsorship
of such activities. This completes the alienation of the Kashmiri Muslims
from the "democratic" and "secular" state of India. The actions of these
personnel needs to be rewarded with severe disciplinary action, however, the
212wirsing, 1994:154.
213Wirsing, 1994:158.
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Indian government justifies their actions by saying that the troops act in self
defense.214 It also justifies these actions by saying that such actions are
needed to contain terrorism. Clearly, there can be exaggeration when
reporting such facts, but the fact is the Center itself has all but acknowledged
the excesses of the security forces, and clearly there have been violation of
human rights in graphic forms. Given that torture and deprivation of civil
rights is the norm in almost all of India particularly when dealing with
secessionist movements, in Kashmir, according to a renowned civil
libertarian in New Delhi, it was "absolutely universal" and only more
"systematic and extreme" than in other parts of India.215
In the 1989-90 conflict, while lip service was being paid to find a
political solution to the problem, the Singh government, like the Gandhi
governments before him, sought to suppress the revolt, and to authorize
stronger steps toward counter insurgency, no matter how brutal the
execution. 216
(ix) The Hindu Backlash
The Hindus of India have always felt threatened by the special
conditions granted to Kashmir. Some of these which were passed in 1952,
further aggravated the Indian public. These include the highly limited
jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court in, a limited applicability of Article
352 of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir. Article 352 states that the
President has a right to declare a state of emergency in case of invasion, or a
threat to the stability of the country. However, even such an article, vital for
national defense was limited because this could only occur in "at the request
or with the concurrence of the government of the state." Additionally, there
214 Bose, Mohan, Navlakha, Banerjee, 1990:652.
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was the use of a distinct flag, while no other state in India had this right to
use a separate state flag, and lastly, the rights of Kashmiris to enjoy full
fledged rights in the rest of India, while the citizens of India would have only
limited rights in the state of Jammu and.217 This bias toward Muslims has
been a potent factor in rising Hindu fundamentalism and has therefore been
a serious factor plaguing Indian politics. For one, the Hindus believe that far
too many concessions are given to the minorities, including the Sikhs and
the Muslims, and such discrimination has not benefited them. Therefore,
extremely concerned, they have lobbied at all levels to reverse this
discrimination and argue that despite the fact that they are the majority in
India, they are also the ones suffering the most. No doubt, this is viewed
with alarm by all other minorities including the Muslims, who therefore feel
that the secular project in India is most certainly a sham.
Hindu nationalist feelings include a strong resentment against the
states "pampering" of Muslims, and a generally negative impression of
Muslims, including the suspicion that Muslims had an inherent loyalty to
Pakistan, and Pakistan was engaging in terrorist activities in India. This
pervasive Hindu nationalist mood which is distinctly anti-Muslim has only
succeeded in further eroding secular values. Given this Hindu revivalist
notion, it is not entirely improbable to believe Wirsing who states that "90%
of India's Hindus would today back the BJP's election pledge to abolish
Article 370, to bring all of India's states under the constitution of India, and
would back the party's means to amend civil law to compel Muslims to a
single civil code."218
217Kadian, 1993:108.
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(x) Economic Causes
Notwithstanding Article 370, Kashmir has not been treated any
differently in terms of the hegemonic power structure which determines
Center-state relations. As with other states, the Central government has
become substantially more powerful than envisioned in the Constitution. It
has a disproportionate control over finances, taxes, resources and foreign aid.
By virtue of the several Five Year Plans organized and executed by the
Planning Commission since independence, the Center determines which
state receives aid, the size, and the distribution. Furthermore, it controls
many key administrative, employment-generating services like the Indian
Administrative Service, the Indian Police Service and the Indian Revenue
Service. It also controls the paramilitary forces and the governors office in
each state. This over-centralization has been resisted not only by Kashmir,
but by several other states as well.
However, specifically to Kashmir, this over-centralization has
hampered its economic growth. In addition to the other political grievances
of the people of Kashmir, these economic controls only serve to exacerbate
the problem. There is an outflow of finances from the state since most of
the money is invested out of the state (the credit to deposit ratio is only 36%,
the lowest in the country), there is a shortage of electric power despite the fact
that it is the timber and water resources from Kashmir that are used for the
rest of the country.219
Additionally, such discrimination has been historical. As stated
elsewhere in the thesis, following the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah's
government in 1953, the center has engaged in partisan politics, and has
controlled the flow of finances to the state in order to retain support. For
219Kadian, 1993:155-156.
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example, the central assistance given to the state was disproportionately in
the form of a loan, rather than a grant, in contrast to the Center’s policies
with other states.220 Furthermore there has been discrimination against the
Muslims not only in terms of finances, but also in terms of employment.
Overall in India, the Muslims tend to be the poorest sections of the
population. The position of the Muslims have not improved since 1953.
The Muslims of the state have no more than 13% share in central
government jobs, and their share in services is less than 6%.221 This has
long been a point of contention for both the Indian Muslims as well as
Pakistan who see this as a failure of the secular project.
Failure of the Secular Project?
Pasha (1992) suggests that the problem with India and secular
principles is that secularism was never fully "internalized.”222 This means
that as a mass ideology, secularism did not manage to retain control as the
communal character of Indian politics demonstrates. But even as a state
ideology, secularism has declined. Under Nehru, when the Congress had a
monopoly of nationalist ideology, there was broad acceptance of secularism
as part of Indian politics by the dominant political and social groups.
However, this begins a decline with the death of Nehru, and exacerbated
particularly under the regime of Indira Gandhi. Indira Gandhi time and
time again used communal politics to maintain power. This has culminated
in the rise of right-wing religious consciousness against some of the legacies
of Nehru including affirmative action for the minorities, tolerance for other
220punjabi, 1992:142.
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religions etc . 223 Within Kashmir itself, the proponent of secularism was the
National Conference. However with the erosion of the National Conference
as a result of its own excesses in complicity with the Congress, the voice of
secularism has also been losing ground in Kashmir
.
224
There has been a rise in Muslim fundamentalism, clearly indicating
that the secular nature of Kashmir is being challenged. The mosque now
serves as a place of worship as well as recruiting fundamentalists and
militants. The cultural and political dimensions of religious life, like in the
Punjab, have been reinvigorated. The exodus of many Hindu families from
the region also is indicative of the failure of the secular project. This exodus
of moderate Hindus has been allegedly matched by the import of armed right
wing and fundamentalist Hindu organizations, including the Shiv Sena and
the RSS. This importation has allegedly been encouraged and instituted by
the Center . 225
Pasha also suggests that it is not the growing fundamentalization of
Islam which has resulted in such a chaotic state in Kashmir. However, it is
the existing social situation where the Muslims have been in a continually
repressed and disadvantaged position that has made them turn to their
religion. He suggest that the "primordial sense of being and the restricted
code have drawn heavily upon Islam which has always remained the
primary source of identity for Muslims ."226 Therefore, fundamentalists
have emerged as a response to the inexorable social conditions, and it is
certainly not something inherent to the religion itself.
223Pasha,1992:376.
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While the uprising has multiple roots and causes, and ignorance of
any one issue is not academic, it is clear that the mismanagement and heavy
handedness by the Center has resulted in alienation, and a decline in
democratic and secular principles as espoused in the Constitution. If the
Center had not engaged in rigging elections continually, or had not brutally
suppressed the uprisings, and had respected the strong individual character
of Kashmiriyat, there would not have been an erosion of secular and
democratic principles, which could have perhaps prevented the escalation of
the conflict.
Conclusion
The conflict has been phenomenal in the number of casualties
suffered. Figures for the number of dead range from 6000 to 35,000 in the
period 1988-1993. (The low figure is given by the government and the high
figure by the militants)227 Additionally, of the 150,000 Flindus in the Valley,
only a few thousand are left. The others have died or fled. On the other
hand, the Muslims constitute a majority of deaths, at the hands of the armed
forces. Both Hindus and Muslims feel betrayed by the government. While
the Muslims feel "mutilated and defiled" by the government, the Hindus
feel "uprooted and betrayed". However, both feel a great deal of anger
toward the Center.228
For India, the issue has marked the erosion of both democratic
principles as well as secularism. The inability of the Center to reach a
political accommodation with the terrorists, and their willingness to resort to
rigging elections etc., in an effort to hold power marks an erosion of
227wirsing, 1994:138.
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democratic principles. Also, their inability to reach a political solution forces
them to resort to the use of the Army. The Army has so far remained an
apolitical institution, but is decreasingly less so, especially in the aftermath of
Operation Blue Star.229 On the secular front, the rising Islamic
fundamentalism has led to anti-Muslim attitudes and violence across the
country.
In order to maintain its unity, India must somehow maintain, for the
loss of Kashmir would perhaps mark the beginning of the disintegration of
India. Varshney's (1992) prognosis for India's existence as a secular
democracy is perhaps not good. According to him, India's secular national
polity functions in an environment of a liberal democracy. It was Nehru's
commitment to democratic liberal principles that made Nehru offer
plebiscite to the Kashmiris. But soon nationalism defined the limits of
liberalism. Does liberalism also include the freedom to secede? If it does not
let a people secede then people are not free to choose their rulers. But if it
does concede freedom to secede it becomes a "lofty but bloodless principle"
for people outside the areas of secession. Therefore, for Varshney, a liberal
democracy can only function only where a nation has already been
constructed 230 Certainly this seems true in the case of India.
Over the years, India has constantly accused Pakistan of aiding the
militants in Kashmir. Although Pakistan formally denies these charges,
there are certain pieces of evidence that demonstrate Pakistani involvement
in the insurgency. There are certain international press reports which
229Ganguly, 1992:365.
230varshney, 1992:197.
108
suggest existence of sanctuaries for insurgents in Pakistan Occupied, or Azad
Kashmir.231
India has to wake up to the fact that the crisis in Kashmir is not solely
the result of impoverishment, unemployment and such things. It is equally
not the result of some fanatic Islamic fundamentalists who want to break up
the secular democracy of India. The problems are within India and India has
to abide by the promise made by Nehru on November 2, 1947, "...the fate of
Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have
given not only to the people of Kashmir, but to the whole world."232 New
Delhi also has to realize that a measured and relentless use of force will not
keep the Kashmir Valley within the Indian Union. The fact is that no
Kashmiri Muslim wants to remain part of India. The more efforts and more
troops New Delhi sends to Kashmir with the hope of suppressing the
Kashmiri right to self determination, results in the peoples sympathizing
with militants, and supporting them. Abhorring the atrocities that have
been executed by the Indian troops, the Kashmiri people have no desire
whatsoever to remain with India. The point remains that, with its large
Muslim population, Kashmir can no longer be used as a litmus test of India's
secular form of government.
By that same token, Pakistan should realize that the current
insurgency is not an automatic indication that Kashmir wants to accede to
Pakistan. This is best exemplified by the cry,"We want freedom.’ 233
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Kashmir has also become a litmus test for patriotism in Pakistan. Religion
cannot become the only basis by which Pakistanis can decide that Kashmir
rightfully belongs to them. Admittedly, the overwhelming Muslim majority
in Kashmir does share the same religion, as Pakistan, Islam. However, the
cries of the Kashmiri Muslims, as well as the militants from the Jammu &
Liberation Front (JKLF) are clear. As stated clearly by one militant from the
JKLF in an interview 23L
"We will not accept anything less than independence. We are not bent on
winning elections and getting seats. Our armed struggle is for independence
in. Kashmir.."
A few months ago, the ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan brazenly talked
of a 1,000 year war to wrench Kashmir from India. To counter this, her
Indian counterpart, ex-Prime Minister V.P. Singh, equally callously and
ignorantly warned that a local war ignited in Kashmir by Pakistani proxies
would not even endure 1,000 hours.235 While indulging in such
meaningless rhetoric, both countries have been in a war preparation phase
since November 1989. They both are in an offensive-defensive stance, and
the possibility of a pre-emptive strike looms in the back drop.
Accompanying such bellicose rhetoric is the increased build up in military
capabilities far in excess of any reasonable requirements. While in the rest of
the world there is talk of disarmament and peace, India and Pakistan have
raised their military expenditures. In 1987-88 alone, while India's defense
spending was $9,730 million, Pakistan's was $2,540 million.236
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The truth is that neither Pakistan nor India can afford to have this
war. If they both were to fight until all their objectives have been achieved
(which is exactly what both governments claim they want to do), then claims
are that such a war could easily last up to six weeks or even longer. Estimates
have been made that even if the war was to last only 1,000 hours (the claim
made by V.P.Singh. ex-Prime Minister of India), the cost for India alone
would be Rs. 27,000 crore! This is assuming an Indian victory! Broadly
speaking, estimates have been made that compared to the 1971 war which
was one of a low intensity conflict, and whose cost was Rs.200 crore a week,
the current conflict, if escalated into a war would cost the Indian
Government alone Rs.4,500 crores a week. Political scientists have then
come to the conclusion that this cost would equal the current budget
allocation for agriculture, rural development, energy, industry, minerals and
social services, and will put the Indian economy back by a decade!237 (Such
estimates from the Pakistani point of view were not available, but it is
assumed that the costs would be the same in terms of lives lost, economic
development programs foregone, etc.).
Fundamentally, the fact remains that war would be a calamity not
only for Pakistan, but for India also. Both of them can ill afford to have a war
at this time, while their internal political and economic state is floundering
and in a complete disarray. While there is talk of war, the danger of a nuclear
war exists horrifyingly in the background. Both India and Pakistan have
nuclear capabilities, and the possibility of one of them using it as an ultimate
hedge against defeat cannot be ruled out. The two sides are playing a
classical game of nerves, and waiting for the other partner to blink.
However, neither show any signs of doing so. International experts believe
237India Today, "Scary Scenario",June 30, 1990:34.
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that scientists in both countries can rig a bomb in less than a week of getting
the appropriate signals from their respective governments. While Pakistan
has provisions for about 5-6 bombs, India has provisions for about 40-60.
With the possibility of a long war becoming a nuclear-biological-chemical
scenario, it has to be conceded that in such a game there are never any
winners, and never any losers.238
It is time India and Pakistan reevaluated the situation. It is also time
that the current governments really understood the complexity, and more
importantly, the atrocities of their actions. While each exists just to
demonstrate to the other the extent of its own power, they both seem to
forget that they are not playing with their own lives. This dangerous game
they are playing is to determine the fate of a peoples, all of whom want a
fundamental, human right to self determination. The solution to this
problem is not an easy one. This problem has been festering over the past
forty years, and is more than just a territorial problem. I admit I cannot see a
long term solution to this problem, at least one which will leave all three
groups satisfied. However, I strongly believe that it is time that India and
Pakistan stop using Kashmir as an outlet to air these differences. One thing
is clear: there has to be a plebiscite, and this plebiscite has to be administered
as soon as possible. Prior to this, however, India should withdraw all the
paramilitary forces stationed in Kashmir, it must discontinue the "curfew-
raj", and must punish all those security forces personnel who are guilty of
killing innocent people, plundering, raping, and destroying property.
Admittedly if India does let Kashmir have a plebiscite, there will be an
unleashing of fundamentalist passion all over the country. Punjab would be
up and in arms, and the other insurgencies in Assam and Nagaland,
238 India Today
,
June 30, 1990:33.
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amongst others would follow shortly. But as I have argued before, the
Kashmiri people should not be made to suffer. These passions to a great
extent have been unleashed by the Center by its obvious disregard for
Kashmir, and by its corrupt regime. Kashmir can longer be part of India, and
India has to come to terms with this.
Pakistan for its part must stop supporting any insurgency in Kashmir,
by training militants, providing insurgency camps and shelters. Pakistan
must also remove all the troops from the border, and must allow for
plebiscite.
The U.N. should dispatch peacekeeping forces to the area, and if
possible oversee the administering of a plebiscite. This would be by far the
best solution to the crisis at hand. I do have to admit that assuming that this
would be an easy task to accomplish would be highly utopic. India does not
want to let go of Kashmir, irrespective of the circumstances, and Pakistan
wants to seize Kashmir so that Muslim "brotherhood" can be established.
Other solutions to this problem could potentially be that India should
seriously listen to the voice of the Kashmiri people, and to the best of their
abilities try and redress the wrongs suffered. However, in my opinion, I
believe that the Indian government has crossed all permissible boundaries,
and irrespective of the situation, the Kashmiri people will not want to stay
with India. However, assuming the impossible, even if Kashmir decides to
stay with India, this is not the end of the problem because Pakistan would
never allow this, and moreover, any solution would have to include a
reassessment of federalism, secularism, and democracy in Indian politics.
Center-state relations would have to assume a new dimension, and this
would mean politicians would necessarily have to forego their personal
interest to meet broader goals. This seems highly implausible.
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The other extreme solution would be to have Kashmir accede to
Pakistan. This would once again not solve the problem, but in fact would
aggravate it. India will not let Kashmir accede to Pakistan not only because
that would signify an end to the secular state of India, but also because
Kashmir is of high strategic and military convenience to India.
There is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that the conflict has been a
direct result of the over-interference by the Center in the state, a lack of truly
democratic principles, and an erosion of secular values. Much like the case
of Punjab, there seems to be only one choice left, a plebiscite in Kashmir to
determine what the people want. This plebiscite, if granted, would somehow
retrieve some of the democratic aspects of India's political structure. It may
lose Kashmir, and in the process both Assam and the Punjab, but the blame
for this is nowhere else to be found in the communal politics and lack of
federal principles and democracy exercised by the center.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF INDIA'S SECULAR DEMOCRACY?
The above discussion of the crises in both the Punjab and the Kashmir
leaves us with a key question-is India a secular democracy? The actions of
the Center in both states have clearly been undemocratic, repressive and the
policies which have been enacted are alienating in nature.
From chapter 1, it is evident that there are some prerequisites for a
democracy. These include a certain level of urbanization, a degree of
economic development, literacy, politics based on compromise and
cooperation, lack of corruption, lack of repression, and a provision for
articulating demands made by groups through democratic channels. As far
as the first two indicators are concerned, Punjab fares better than Kashmir.
However, on the whole, both have increased their rates of literacy and have
greater urbanization over the years from independence. Whether literacy
and urbanization are important indicators of democracy are different
questions altogether. I posit that while literacy and urbanization have been
important for Western countries to democratize, it is not necessarily the only
way to attain democracy. Of far more importance is the level of repression
present in society, and the provision for channels to articulate demands. As
is evident in both the Punjab and Kashmir case, on these two important
counts, India fails to be a democracy.
Instead of providing black or white answers about the existence or lack
of democracy. Diamond, Linz and Lipset suggest that the boundary between a
democratic and undemocratic state is sometimes blurred and imperfect, and
there lies a much broader variation of political systems. They therefore
recognize various grades of democracy. They suggest that in countries
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where the effective power of an elected official is limited, political party
competition is restricted, freedom and/or fairness of elections compromised,
that although there elections may be held, this competition still does not
reflect actual popular preferences. Additionally, where political parties are so
limited that some political interests are unable to compete, so far an almost
accurate description of India today, that system is a semi-democratic
system. 239 So far then, according to Lipset et al., India has degenerated from
being a democratic country, to a semi-democratic country. If actions are not
taken to address the problems in both the Punjab and the Kashmir, and the
role of the military is increased, India will continue the slide away from
being a democracy. As stated by Stepan (1988), as long as there is rule by
military governance, the question of the country being a democracy is highly
tenable. The lack of democratic principles, intervention of the military, and
lack of free and fair elections therefore leaves India in a very dubious
position vis-a-vis the level of democracy.
The following table theorized by Lipset gives us some indication as to
what how effective a democracy India is.240
Table 2
An Effective Democracy
LEGITIMACY
EFFECTIVENESS
+
A B
C D
Societies which would be included in category A would be countries
like the United States, Sweden, and Britain which have both high legitimacy
239Diamond, Larry
,
fuan J.Linz, & Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing
Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990:
8 .
240Lipset, Seymour Martin, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development
and Political Legitimacy" in The American Political Science Review, 1967:90.
116
and effectiveness, and therefore have a stable democratic political system.
Conversely, ineffective regimes are those in category D, which symbolizes an
unstable regime, and would be break down unless held down by force. I posit
that in this schema of things, India under the rule of Nehru, from a period of
1947-1965 fell in category B where it was a legitimate government, but
perhaps not a highly effective one. By contrast, post 1967, under the aegis of
Indira Gandhi, and her son, Rajiv Gandhi, India has moved closer and closer
into category D where it has lost its legitimacy, and is still not effective. This
is especially true of the relationship of the Center with both states described
in this thesis. Therefore according to this model, the democratic regime in
India is highly unstable and could potentially "break down". As is obvious
from the previous two chapters, both the Punjab and Kashmir have been
held down by force.
Addressing the several theoretical issues raised in Chapter 1 after
having discussed the actual cases in the Punjab and Kashmir, would be a
worthwhile exercise to see how well India measures up to the different
standards of democracy.
Political Culture
With regards to the thesis that the political culture must be conducive
to democracy, Dahl (1971), in particular, emphasizes the importance of a
democratic culture among the elite especially in the early stages. Clearly in
India, the commitment to liberal values and democracy existed since the first
quarter of the nineteenth century. The independence movement was largely
non-violent, and there was a professional bureaucratic system left by the
British which was still largely intact and available for the Indians. An
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idealized commitment of Western notions of liberal justice and welfare was
part of the elite. Western educated culture. 241
The Indian National Congress espoused, "democratic rules of
procedure, tolerance of adversaries and reconciliation of conflicting claims."
This was further emphasized by the Gandhian notion of ahimsa242
accommodation, religious tolerance and compromise.243 Therefore,
colonialism was a crucible of India’s democracy. Clearly, post 1947, there was
a commitment to democracy, and this democracy was espoused by the elites
and this early institutionalization of democratic principles under the
Congress was crucial for the existence of democracy in India.
However, some scholars note that this commitment to democracy
espoused by the Western educated elite could be characterized as "gift from
the elite to the masses."244 This fact is reinforced by Saberwal who suggests
that perhaps the reason for this crisis of governability is that, while after
independence, India took over liberal Western attitudes, and the forms in
terms of institutions, there have also been some serious difficulties, in
"making commensurate adjustments in redefining and reconceptualizing
attitudes, orientations and ideas."245 He suggests that institutions in India
designed after Western models have no deep layer within Indian tradition.
The endowment of cultural and institutional resources did not leave much
in terms of usable material for constructing resilient and durable state
structures. For example, the lack of a master institution such as the Catholic
241Das Gupta, Jyotindra, in Larry Diamond
,
fuan J.Linz, & Seymour Martin Lipset, eds..
Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1990: 232.
242Ahimsa espoused by Gandhi is the principle of non-violence.
243Das Gupta, 1990:232-233.
244Kohli, Atul,ed., India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988:9.
245Saberwal, Satish, India: The Roots of Crisis. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986:8.
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church has been one important differing factor between Europe and India.
Therefore, the elements needed to sustain institutions with western design
were not available.246
The Actions of the Political Elite - Post 1947
The big change in Indian politics occurred with the death of Nehru
and with Indira Gandhi taking power. Since 1967 under Indira Gandhi, the
capacity of the state to govern based on compromise and consensual politics
has declined. Along with this decline, there has been an erosion of order,
and the manifestation of this process has been activism outside of the
established political channels. This has led to increased violence, and the
growing incapacity of the state to deal with this violence has led to
repression, problems of law and order, corruption and increased violence.
The blame for this decline in democratic principles, and the
disintegration of the Congress is overwhelmingly pointed toward the
dynastic Gandhi rule, especially under Indira Gandhi.247 The Congress
under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi was one based on personalistic rule
and where members were selected not based on their level of competence,
but instead in terms of their loyalty to the Gandhis. This fact has been amply
documented in the literature (e.g., Kohli, 1990; Weiner, 1989; Saberwal, 1986;
Das Gupta, 1990; Mathur, 1992; Mitra, 1990; Varshney, 1989; Manor 1988; Hart,
1988; Cohen, 1988).
What perhaps formally marked the decline of democratic rule was the
Emergency period between 1975-1977 when Indira Gandhi suspended all civil
and political liberties, muting opposition rule and voice, restricting the
246Saberwal, 1986:57.
247Kohli, Atul, citing Gramsci, in Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of
Governabilitv. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990:5.
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freedom of the press, by claming that the security of India was at stake.248
Clearly, this was not entirely true, and as stated by Shouri (1978), this almost
amounted to fascist rule.
Following the Emergency (1975-1977), although Indira Gandhi did
hold elections, in which she massively lost, the absence of a viable
alternative political party to hold power brought her back into power in the
early 1980s. By this time, her deep desire to hold onto power no matter what
the cost resulted in the decay of the Congress party as a party of democracy.
Indira Gandhi "increasingly transformed the nature of the organization from
an institutional mode of accommodation to an electoral instrument
beholden to a ruling leadership."249 The only way for both Rajiv and Indira
Gandhi to preserve their power was to rely on populism, and to undermine
those institutions which were designed to facilitate orderly challenges. By
making direct promises to the electorate, a leader can mobilize broad
electoral support. Therefore, the destruction of institutional constraints left
more control in the hands of the leader, and enabled the leader to engage in
nepotism. Both Indira and Rajiv worked to increase their own personal
power base rather than increase and strengthen government institutions.250
This is particularly true of Indira Gandhi and has been evidenced in her
actions both toward the Punjab and Kashmir. In the Punjab, her disavowal
of involvement with the moderate Sikh factions, yet her patronage and
latent support of the radical Bhindranwale was a way for her to maintain
power. Such political interference introduced widespread corruption,
therefore leading to an erosion of democracy. Simultaneously, as these
248Weiner, Myron, The Indian Paradox : Essays in Indian Politics, New Delhi: Sage
Publications, 1989:326.
249Das Gupta, 1990:235.
250Kohli, 1990:18.
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institutions have weakened, non-institutional paths to leadership such as
political inheritance have taken the place of established norms. This is
evident following the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984, her son, Rajiv
was unanimously "given" the position of Prime Minister and ruled head of
the Congress party.
Therefore, the decay of political institutions was marked by the rise of
Indira Gandhi to power, and her desire to control the reins of power marked
the beginning of decline of secular politics. As is evident, the political
culture was no longer conducive to democracy. With the death of Nehru,
the commitment to democratic values by the leading elite was no longer
valid, as it was now far more important to maintain power than to be
committed to democratic values. Wherever there is centralization,
democracy is threatened. As is obvious, under the Gandhis democracy was
seriously hampered.
Socioeconomic Causes
The thesis that there must be some amount of economic wealth, and
socioeconomic satisfaction before there can be democracy appears to be true
in the case of India. (Lipset, 1967; Huntington, 1969) For example, Bardhan
identifies three classes, the industrial capitalists, the rich farmers and
bureaucrats and suggests that management of conflict among them has led to
policies which have resulted in low capital accumulation and productivity
and aimed at expanding patronage-inducing elements like food subsidies,
public sector investment, and have therefore shown a bias for consumption
rather than investment in order to garner support and votes.251 This is
251 Mathur, Kuldeep, "The State and the Use of Coercive Power in India," Asian Survey, Vol.
XXXII, No. 4, April 1992:339, citing Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of Developmentin
India. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.
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obvious in both the Kashmir and the Punjab where the Planning
Commission under Central government rule has ensured to keep both states
in a dependent relationship vis-a-vis the Center. The Sikhs of Punjab were
probably justified in feeling some anger in that since they were considered to
be the bread basket of the country, the Center refused to undertake any major
industrialization project in the Punjab. This is definitely a sore point for the
Sikhs because they feel they are disadvantaged in relation to the rest of the
country as a lack of their industrialization. Likewise the Muslims of
Kashmir have been deprived of economic benefits which have been granted
to the rest of India. Therefore, the Center has obviously and very blatantly
attempted to stay in control of both states, furthering fueling the angst of
these two groups of people.
Repression
The thesis that democracy cannot exist where there is military
suppression once again holds true in the case of India. In 1984, there were at
least 40 million Indians living under military law, making India one of the
world's largest military-dominated democratic states.252 The state in India
has been too quick to adopt coercive methods in order to meet social
challenges. The erosion of the political party system weakened state society
relations and supported a widening police criminal politician nexus.253 For
the state the first step in dealing with any sort of uprising in either the
Punjab or the Kashmir has been to suspend civil rights, and the liberal
democratic principles of the Indian political system tends to disappear at the
252Cohen, Stephen, P., "The Military and Indian Democracy," in Atul Kohli ed., Indies
Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988:100.
253Mathur, 1992:348.
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local level. Any threat is viewed as a blatant threat to the existence of the
state and a challenge to the authority of the state. As documented in the case
of Kashmir especially, there have been widespread abuses of power, and
repressive prison administration.254 This is obviously not indicative of a
democratic regime.
Clearly, the state in India is using force which may ensure short term
compliance, but at the same time the frequency of its use may delegitimize
the state. The lack of realization of this fact is indicative once again of the
narrow, self serving desires of the political elite who have a desire to hold
onto power no matter what the costs may be. Although the stability of a
democratic state depends on the way it responds to social conflicts and the
way it uses force, the political elite in India under the Gandhis failed to
realize this and therefore contributed to the growing alienation of the polity.
Additionally, while in the past India's military has been mostly apolitical, in
the recent past, this is not true anymore, and the political activities of the
Indian military, especially in light of Operation Blue Star has been growing.
Corruption
In India, political corruption is abundant. This does not bode well for
democracy. In Robert Wade's study of corruption in India, he states that
"The essential business of a state minister is not to make policy. It is to
modify the application of rules and regulations on a particularistic basis , in
return for money and/or loyalty
.'"'255
As stated by both Dalpino (1990) and Diamond (1990) in their study of
Thailand and Nigeria, corruption led to deep cynicism which in turn led to
254Mathur, 1992:347-348.
255Klitgaard, Robert, "Strategies for Reform," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds..
The Global Resurgencv of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,
1993:231.
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the breakdown of democracy. Corruption in India is certainly not indicative
of a democratic country. This corruption is also evident with the way
governments are overthrown by the center when state governments are not
in favor with the center. In the place of a hostile state government, a more
acquiescent government is placed in power. This happened both with the
Punjab and the Kashmir, especially with the latter on at least a few occasions.
Move away from a Secular State?
The following is a breakdown by religious orientation based on the
1981 census.256
Table 3
India's Religious Orientation
Number Percentage
Hindus 475,000,000 82.6%
Muslims 75,500,000 11.4%
Christians 16,200,000 2.4%
Sikhs 13,100,000 2.0%
Buddhists & Jains 7,900,000 1.2%
There are two types of secularism. The first one was espoused by men
like Gandhi who believed in the intrinsic relationship between religion and
politics, and those who attempted to separate religion and politics. For
Gandhi, the latter "understood neither religion nor politics".257 Gandhi
sought to be respectful to all religions and incorporated various religions
into politics. In this way, secularism was an area in which the government
and the people find a balance between religious beliefs and the demands of
modern society.258 In contrast, Jawarharlal Nehru's concept of secularism
involved a division between religion and politics. His commitment to
256weiner, 1989:47.
257Malik, Yogendra K., & Dhirendra K.Vajpeyi citing Nandy, "The Rise of Hindu Militancy:
India's Secular Democracy at Risk," Asian Survey, Vol.XXIX, No. 3, March 1989:309.
258Malik & Vajpeyi, 1989:309.
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rational scientific ideology denied the relevance of religion. The secular
policy he designed for the Congress became the dominant paradigm for the
entire country. According to this paradigm, there would be a division
between religion and politics. Nehru believed that industrialization would
erode the influence of religion as these religious and ethnic loyalties would
be replaced by class identification. Although economic factors would
aggravate social conflict, with modernization, the influence of religion
would decline. This was supported by scholars such as Smelser, Parsons,
Eisenstadt, and Shils who held that "constant interaction between cultural
norms and the value structure of the center and periphery would result in
integration of the peripheral communities into a larger network based on a
cohesive value system ."259 However, this has failed to come about in India,
as in the absence of a common value system there is only a further division
within society, between different religions. Political parties and their elites
have secured votes on communal lines, and have therefore propagated these
communal divisions .260 According to Malik et al., contrary to the belief that
modernization would lead to erosion of traditional religious sentiments,
politicization and mobilization has led to revival of religious identities,
including Hindu fundamentalism .261
Additionally, where also there are major ethnic and regional
cleavages, the absence of provisions for decentralization of power feeds
ethnic insecurity, and violent conflict, which may lead to secessionist
demands. However, the resultant force of curbing these demands leads to a
suppression of democracy. Unless resolved by political means which involve
moderation, compromise and accommodation, through institutions such as
259Malik & Vajpeyi, 1989:311.
260Malik & Vajpeyi, 1989:311.
261 Malik & Vajpeyi,1989:324.
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autonomy, federalism, or even statehood within the union, there could be
authority imposed by force, which leads to the deterioration of democratic
rule. Also, a democratic Center could be questioned for its inefficiency in
handling the secessionist crisis, therefore leading to military intervention,
which once again leads to a decay of democratic rule .262 Therefore, as cited by
Das Gupta, "when ethnic leaders are allowed to share power, they generally
act according to the rues of the regime ".263 However, when the response to
ethnic mobilization is repression and exclusion, violence is resultant,
leading to the failure of democracy .264
Since the distribution of employment, education, wealth in India is
determined by the Center and is determined by the political process, this
translates into the fact that each ethnic group can improve its share of
resources by increasing its political power. Therefore, ethnic groups try to
strengthen their group identity to improve their well being by becoming
more politicized. This has led to politicians appealing to communal
divisions in order to get votes .265 The effect this has had on the secular
project in India is detrimental.
Additionally, the role of the state in maintaining these ethnic tensions
has fallen severely short. The recalcitrant Center especially under Indira
Gandhi, could have accommodated these conflicts. However, instead of
attempting to incorporate ethnic demands, which would have lead to
successful management of the conflict, ethnic-based demands have been
repressed. Such a policy has backfired on the government and has fueled the
growing ethnic divisions. Prior to Indira Gandhi, rules for dealing with
262Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1990:29.
263Das Gupta, 1990:262,
264Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1990:29.
265Weiner, 1989:70.
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Center-State conflicts included more inclusionary strategies as long as the
demands were non-secessionist and secular. The state under Nehru
accommodated itself to the diverse nature of Indian society. However, Mrs.
Gandhi came to view accomodative strategies as a personal threat, and
therefore, moved away from political accommodation to political
confrontation.
This decline of secularism in India has been coupled with a rise in
communalism. Communalism in India is a consciousness which draws on
a supposed religious identity and uses this as the basis for an ideology. It
then demands political allegiance to a religious community and supports a
program of political actions designed to further the interests of that political
community ." 266
Contrasting Views
Despite all the features of an eroding Indian democratic polity, quite a
few scholars are uneasy in suggesting that the democracy in India is "about to
fall", and insist that India is a "functioning but strained democracy ."267
These scholars suggests that despite all the problems, India's direction is "yet
to be determined". Clearly, there exists troubled institutions in the form of
greater corruption, lack of political parties, repression etc. However for these
scholars, this does not mean that India is to disintegrate because they suggest,
there are some elements of political and social change such as periodic
elections that actually strengthen India's authority structure. 268 For
example, Kohli suggests that there may be secessionist movements, but the
266Thapar, Romila, "Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern
Search for a Hindu Identity," Modern Asian Studies 23, 2, 1989:209.
267Kohli, 1988:315.
268Kohli, 1990:8.
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basic existence of India as a political unit does not remain threatened. He
suggests that as long as the armed forces are intact a further division of India
is not likely .269 in response to such a claim, it is evident that resorting to the
use of armed forces in order to maintain unity and stability is not indicative
of a democratic state. Therefore although India may still remain as a unit,
and may keep the various parts demanding secession under military rule,
this does not make India a democratic country.
Another view which suggests that the problems faced by India are not
a serious threat are put forth by Mitra (1991). He suggests that the challenges
to democracy from political insurgency, intolerance of minorities,
criminalization of politics and the rise of authoritarianism are not an
accidental feature of Indian politics, but as a matter of fact, are very essential
and "germane’’ to the fact that made democracy in India possible in the very
first place, and are therefore not a problem. He suggests that the state which
sustains Indian democracy appears to sustain regional conflicts by
accommodating them, and then by localizing them.270 Mitra tends to
suggests that the problems faced by India are not unique
,
and finds the
Indian democracy to be rather robust. This optimistic characterization of
democracy in India seems highly implausible when examining the evidence
presented in Chapters 2 & 3. The Central government has not
accommodated the conflicts in any way. Such accommodation would have
led to a mitigation of the conflict. Clearly, the rise in violence and
secessionist demands is indicative of the fact that the Center has not
accommodated these people, and in contrast has very successfully alienated
them. Additionally, merely by localizing a conflict does not make a state
269Kohli, 1990:13
270Mitra, Subhatra Kumar, "Crisis and resilience in Indian democracy," International Social
Science Journal, v. 43, n.3 August 1991: 571.
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democratic. Clearly, to a certain extent the state has managed to localize the
conflict and prevent it from spreading. However, this localization has taken
place at the expense of democracy in both the Punjab and Kashmir.
Another optimistic picture of the democratic polity in India is offered
by Weiner (1989) who suggests that it is the conflict managing role of the
Congress party which has been one of the key factors in sustaining
democracy. While the governing leadership may be tempted to suspend
democratic processes in order to consolidate power, there has also been a
large and influential class of professionals who have a vested interest in
sustaining democracy. Therefore, the primary reason for the continuance of
India's democracy is political, and in the hands of a few elite.271 I posit that
this may be true in the rest of India, but the actions of the Center including
those professionals who have a vested interest in maintaining a democratic
state, has not translated into maintaining democracy for either the people of
the Kashmir or the Punjab. As suggested before, the evidence offered in both
the case of the Punjab and the Kashmir clearly shows that democracy has
been effectively suspended in both states, and the focus has been containing
the secessionist desires with force.
In conclusion, clearly the debate between the Marxists and the
structural functionalists can be applied to the Indian situation. As this thesis
has shown, it appears that the latter, most particularly, the ideas of
Huntington seems to be more applicable to the Indian state. With
independence, as the country started its process of development and moved
from a traditional economy to a more modern one, new social groups were
formed. These new groups had new demands on the central government.
However, the various institutions of India have been unable to cope with
271 Weiner, 1989:33.
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these various demands, and additionally, the organizational decay of the
Indian Congress, along with the lack of an alternative political party to fill
the vacuum has resulted in anomie and decay.
Interesting to note also is the fact that often times the religious
demands made by the Sikhs and Muslims were granted, however, their
economic demands were ignored. This resulted in the religious elements
being fostered, leading to a growing politicization of religion. For example,
in the Shahbano case in the late 1980s where a Muslim woman, Shahbano,
filed a case against her divorced husband asking him for monetary support.
The Supreme Court ruled in her favor, and ordered the husband to pay
alimony. However, this was against the Muslim's personal code of Sharia
where the husband is no longer responsible for his divorced wife, but she
becomes the responsibility of her family. However, in the Indian
constitution, there is a provision for the husband to pay alimony.
Regardless, the Supreme Court decision aggravated the Muslims who
demanded that it be overturned. Rajiv Gandhi, fearful of losing Muslims
votes, granted this and a bill was passed in Congress that the personal civil
code of Sharia took precedence over the general civil code espoused in the
Constitution. This bill aggravated the Hindus, who, as documented before
feel the actions of the Center to be unfair in their interests. Similarly, in the
case of the Sikhs, the allowance of religious demands of having Amritsar
labeled a holy city etc., and the rejection of the economic demands have
further politicized religion and made religion the underlying factor of these
conflicts, moving away from the secular principles of India.
Therefore, the politicization of these conflicts on religious demands,
and the organizational decay of the democratic institutions have led to a lack
of proper channels for voicing concerns. This, along with the inability of the
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Center to be flexible enough to accommodate the tensions in an appropriate
fashion have resulted in increased tension and violence. This violence has
been further repressed by the state, which has further led to a more serious
alienation of the populace, and has eroded the legitimacy of the state itself.
This has been most stark in the case of the Punjab and the Kashmir.
However, the way the Center has dealt with the crisis in both these states, as
well as with the other crises in Assam, Nagaland etc., have all succeeded in
eroding the legitimacy of the state nationwide. The prognosis is not good.
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